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I. INTRODUCTION
One. of the greatest threats the United States must confront during the next
millennium is the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction out of Russia.'
There is a growing threat that Russian Organized Crime ("ROC") groups will
smuggle nuclear material out of Russia, and then sell it to terrorists to use against
the United States.2 The United States must implement additional programs that
will prevent weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled out of Russia
while continuing to support the programs already in place.3 Although the Cold
War ended over a decade ago and Russia is no longer an adversary to the United
States, the threat of nuclear attacks remains."
The United States and Russia made large investments in weapons of mass
destruction during the Cold War.5 A vast collection of weapons were left behind,
resulting in half the world's nuclear arsenal being housed in Russia.6 The
powerful system of controls that Russia once had over its nuclear facilities
greatly diminished with the end of the Cold War.' In 1991, a dissatisfied former
Soviet Officer offered a former Greenpeace President an eight hundred kilogram
nuclear warhead.' In 1995, nine members of an organized crime group stolehighly enriched uranium' with the intent to smuggle it out of Russia.'0 While the
I. See Bill Richardson, Post-Cold War Nuclear Challenges, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING
THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 23 (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000) (stating that as weapons of
mass destruction continue to spread, there is an increased threat that they may be used against the United
States).
2. See Steve Macko, FBI Director Warns Russian Organized Crime Threatens U.S. National
Security .... 3 ERRI DAILY INTELLIGENCE REP. 276, at http://www.emergency.com/rusn-mob.htm (Oct. 3,
1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the ROC groups' vast wealth and power
heightens the threat that they will procure nuclear weapons to sell to terrorists or rogue states).
3. Richardson, supra note 1, at 23.
4. See id. (expressing the opinion that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses an enormous
threat to the United States).
5. See id. at 25 (alluding to the fact that weapons of mass destruction, once seen as a necessity to survival,
pose one of the biggest threats to the national security of the United States).
6. See Carah Ong, Indecent Explosives, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND., at http://www.nuclearfiles.
org/issues/nuclear-weapons.states.html (last revised Jan. 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(stating Russia has 7500 strategic nuclear weapons and between 7000 and 15,000 suspected non-strategic
nuclear weapons).
7. Rensselaer Lee, Nuclear Smuggling from the Former Soviet Union: Threats and Responses, FOREIGN
POLY RES. INST., at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRIO42701.html (Apr. 27, 2001) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that privatization in Russia meant that nuclear complexes were no
longer under government control, leaving the employees with lowered salaries and a lack of food, clothing, and
other essential items).
8. See Worldwide Demand for Nuclear Weapons Materials: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (app. to testimony of
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch), at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960320c.htm (Mar.
20, 1996) [hereinafter Deutch] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (reporting that the former Soviet
Official was quick to point out the inadequate security at the nuclear storage sites).
9. See International Information Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, CIA Report Says Russian Nuclear
Security Improving but 'Risks Remain,' at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02022602.htm (Feb. 22,
2002) [hereinafter CIA Report] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing highly-enriched
uranium as uranium enriched to 20% or greater in the uranium isotopes).
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United States' strong economy allows government implementation of exceptionally
reliable security to guard weapons of mass destruction stored within its borders,
Russia's slow economy does not."
To fully appreciate the destructive nature of weapons of mass destruction, it
is important to have a general understanding of how they are defined and
categorized. First, a nuclear weapon is any explosive device that gains its power
from the release of energy stored within the nucleus 2 of an atom. 3 The magnitude of
the denotation is realized by the yield of the weapon, which is measured in
kilotons.' 4 To illustrate the potential destruction of a nuclear explosion, a one
hundred kiloton bomb, which is eight times larger than the bomb dropped on
Hiroshima, 5 would create a twenty to forty mile radiation zone that would kill• • 16
everyone exposed to the radiation. The average yield of a strategic nuclear
warhead is five hundred kilotons.17
Nuclear weapons consist of either fission weapons (atomic bombs)" or
fusion weapons (thermonuclear weapons).' The bombs dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki 2° during World War II are excellent examples of the type of mass
destruction caused by fission bombs. 2' To underscore the amount of destruction a
10. See Deutch, supra note 8, at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/l1996_hr/s960320c.htm (speculating
that the ultimate destination of the uranium was South Korea).
1I. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining that the Russian system of safety controls over
nuclear facilities have been dramatically decreased from the time preceding the Cold War).
12. See MERRIAN WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 796 (10th ed. 1994) [hereinafter MERRIAN
WEBSTER] (defining nucleus as "the positively charged central portion of an atom comprising nearly all of the
atomic mass and consisting of protons and neutrons").
13. 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 596 (1996).
14. See Steve Fetter, The Effects of Nuclear Detonations and Nuclear War, in A PRIMER FOR THE
NUCLEAR AGE (1989), at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/fetter/Effects%primer.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that a one kiloton bomb is equal to 1000
tons of TNT).
15. See 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 598 (affirming that the bomb in Hiroshima
was dropped on August 6, 1945 from a B-29 bomber). "When the bomb reached 1,850 feet (564 meters), a
radar echo set off an explosive inside. This explosive drove a wedge of U-235 into a larger piece of U-235,
setting off the nuclear blast." Id.; see also Fetter, supra note 14, at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/
fetter/Effects%primer.pdf (indicating that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 13 kilotons).
16. See Joseph Cirincione, Historical Overview and Introduction, in REPAIRING THE REGIME:
PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 2 (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000) (adding that a
one megaton bomb would destroy 50 square miles and kill between one and two million people). A 100 kiloton
bomb is small compared to bombs made in 2002. Id.
17. Fetter, supra note 14, at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/fetter/Effects%primer.pdf.
18. See MERRIAN WEBSTER, supra note 12, at 73 (defining atomic bomb as "a bomb whose violent
explosive power is due to the sudden release of energy resulting from the splitting of nuclei of a heavy chemical
element (as plutonium or uranium) by neutrons in a very rapid chain reaction").
19. See id. at 1224 (defining thermonuclear as that "of or relating to the transformations in the nucleus of
atoms of low atomic weight (as hydrogen) that require a very high temperature for their inception (as in the
hydrogen bomb or in the sun)").
20. See 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 598 (asserting that the bomb dropped over
Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 was called "Fat Man"). "In this bomb, an explosive crushed a hollow sphere of
plutonium into a core made up of the chemical elements beryllium and polonium. This core then released
neutrons, which triggered a fission chain reaction in the plutonium." Id.
21. See id. at 596 (stating that although nuclear weapons are frequently considered in military planning, the
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fission bomb can produce, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed between
70,000 and 100,000 people and destroyed five square miles of the city.22 The
detonation of fission weapons produces a high-pressure shock wave that quickly
travels outward from the exploded weapon, causing a powerful wind stronger
than the force of a hurricane. 2' High temperatures resulting from the detonation
creates an extremely hot, luminous mass of gas known as a fireball. 4 Fission
bombs are usually detonated by gun-like devices that fire projectiles made from
fissile materialh2
On the other hand, fusion weapons detonate only when exposed to temperatures
equal to or greater than temperatures found in the core of the sun.2' These weapons
get their energy by combining atomic nuclei of the hydrogen isotopes under immense
heat.27 The detonation of a fission bomb is necessary for the detonation of a fusion
bomb because it is the only practical way to produce the enormous amount of heat
21required to create a fusion reaction. In 1951, an experiment with fusion weapons• 29
produced an explosion with the force of several million tons of dynamite. Likewise,
a test using a fifteen-megaton fusion weapon, performed in 1954 by the United
States, resulted in a fireball of over three miles in diameter and a mushroom cloud
that quickly rose into the stratosphere. ° Therefore, a nuclear explosion would result
in devastation, killing millions of unsuspecting people.
Nuclear missiles are commonly used to detonate nuclear weapons.3' Most
nuclear missiles consist of a rocket engine with one or more explosive devices on
32the end, called a warhead. The warhead contains either an atomic or hydrogen
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only two nuclear weapons that have been used since the end of
World War I1).
22. See id. (stating that it would have taken approximately 12,000 metric tons of dynamite to cause the
same amount of damage wrought by the Hiroshima bomb).
23. MICROSOFr ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http://encarta.msn.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2002)
[hereinafter ENCARTA ONLINE] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
24. See id. (explaining that a fireball with a diameter of about 1000 feet would result from the detonation of
a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon).
25. See id. (articulating that the atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima, Japan in 1945 was exploded using a
gun-type weapon). However, atomic bombs can also be detonated by a more complex implosion method where a
sphere shaped layer of high explosives are designed to concentrate the blast toward the center of the bomb where
fissile material is stored. Id.
26. 14 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 597 (noting that the temperature at the sun's core is
approximately 27,000,000 degrees Fahrenheit, or 15,000,000 degrees Celsius).
27. See id. (explaining that deuterium and tritium are the two hydrogen isotopes involved in the fusion
process).
28. See ENCARTA ONLINE, supra note 23, at http://encarta.msn.com (stating that atomic scientists considered
the atomic bomb, or fission bomb, to be the trigger for the thermonuclear bomb, or fusion bomb).
29. Id.
30. See id. (asserting that this fusion explosion led to the discovery of radioactive fallout, which is
radioactive debris that falls from the mushroom cloud produced by a nuclear explosion).
3 1. See 8 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 425 (asserting that nuclear missiles can either be
based on land or based underwater on submarines).
32. See id. (adding that warheads can damage the target by either creating a huge blast of air pressure or by
shooting out many metal fragments that hit and damage the target).
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nuclear device that causes a huge explosion upon detonation.33 A nuclear missile
with multiple warheads can be used to attack a group of closely placed targets
because the warheads can separate from the missile and steer toward individual
targets. 4 A ballistic missile derives its name from the arching, ballistic trajectory
of its flight.35 An intercontinental ballistic missile is a ballistic missile that can• • 36
travel over 5500 kilometers and has the capacity to destroy an entire city. Ballistic
missiles that must travel a great distance from their launching site are guided by
navigational systems.37 Once the missile comes within close range of its target, the• 38 5 39
fuzing mechanism triggers the nuclear warhead and an explosion occurs.
Second, chemical weapons are another type of weapon of mass destruction
with the potential to cause severe devastation. Chemical weapons were first used
effectively in World War I.4 These weapons can affect a person's nervous system,
eyes, nose, skin, or throat.' Chemical agents can exist in the form of a gas, a liquid,
or a solid and may be completely colorless and odorless, making them extremely
hard to detect.42
While some chemical agents only cause bodily harm, others can causedeath.44 Non-lethal chemical agents will cause temporary incapacitation without
33. See id. (noting that some warheads can contain non-nuclear material such as dynamite).
34. Id. (indicating that multiple warheads are called Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
(MIRVs)).
35. FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, BALLISTIC MISSILE BASICS, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
intro/missile/icbm.htm (last updated Oct. 25, 1998) [hereinafter BAUJSTIC MISSILE BASICS] (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that a ballistic missile is guided through the initial journey by engine blasts).
During the second part of the joumey, the engine shuts off and the missile coasts until it drops down upon its target.
Id.
36. See 8 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 425 (asserting that an intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) can travel from approximately 1700 to 3400 miles).
37. See BALUSTIC MISSILE BASICS, supra note 35, at http:/www.fas.org/nuke/intro/missile/icbm.htm
(explaining that navigational systems may be inertial, celestial, or radio controlled). Inertial-qaedance systems
supply constant push to keep the missile on course by correcting any deviation from the path caused by outside
forces. Id. The celestial-qaedance system continuously adjusts the missile's pre-determined path by reference to
fixed stars. Id. The radio controlled guidance system produces signals from the launch site that guide the
missile's path. Id. Radio controls are no longer used because the enemy can easily detect the signals. Id.
38. See 8 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 424 (stating that the fuzing system of a missile,
which is a mechanical or electronic device used to detonate an explosive charge, causes the warheads to explode at
just the right time).
39. Id.
40. See id. at 396 (noting that World War I began in 1914 and ended in 1918).
41. Id.; see also MDB, Chemical Weapons Index, at http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Lab/
4239/chem. weapons/cwindex.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Index] (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing that symptoms from a gas or aerosol chemical agent can
include a running nose, contraction of the pupils which deteriorates a person's vision, an increase in the
production of saliva, and slurred speech).
42. 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 396; see also Chemical Weapons Index, supra note
41, at http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Lab/4239/chemweapons/cwindex.html (explaining that nerve
agents in a pure form are colorless, whereas nerve agents in an impure state are yellowish in color).
43. See 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 396 (explaining that mustard gas is a non-fatal
chemical agent that produces large blisters on the skin).
44. See id. (pointing out that nerve agents or poison gas can cause death).
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inflicting any permanent harm . On the other hand, nerve gas contains chemical
agents with the potential to cause death. 46 There are two major agents of nerve
gas, the G and the V agents.47 The G agents, including the sarin nerve gas used in
the 1995 attacks the Tokyo subways, 48 are typically non-resistant because they
consist of a volatile liquid.49 The symptoms will depend on how a person is
exposed to the nerve gas. For instance, if the gas is inhaled, respiratory symptoms
usually appear first. However, if the liquid form of the agent is ingested,
gastrointestinal symptoms will characteristically appear first.5'
Third, biological weapons are yet another type of weapon of mass destruction.
Biological warfare is the intentional dissemination of an infectious disease that is
ordinarily transmitted through natural courses." The threat of biological warfare
has increased over the past twenty-four years because of improved production
techniques.5 ' These techniques have resulted in more potent strains of organisms
and genetic modification of a non-disease producing agent (non-pathogen) to a
disease-producing organism (pathogen), such as a virus or a bacterium.'
One of the most infectious and feared diseases caused by biological warfare
is anthrax.55 To illustrate the infectious potential of anthrax, it has been estimated
45. See FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS-INTRODUCTION, at http://www.
fas.org/nuke/guide/intro/cw/intro.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 1998) [hereinafter CHEMICAL WEAPONS] (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that these non-lethal riot agents were first developed in the United
Kingdom, and later adopted and used by the United States and many other nations).
46. 3 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, at 396.
47. FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
intro/cw/agent.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 1998) [hereinafter CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS] (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer); see also Chemical Weapons Index, supra note 41, at http://www.geocities.com/Cape
Canaveral/Lab/4239/chemweapons/cwindex.html (asserting that 'G' agents include sarin, soman, tabun, and other
chemical agents that are highly unstable). Thickening materials can be added to 'G' agents to increase the persistency,
thereby increasing the amount of harm caused by this agent. ld 'V' agents, which can enter the body through
inhalation or skin contact, are more persistent than 'G' agents. Id. The persistence of the 'V' agents make them more
deadly than 'G' agents. Id.
48. Task Force Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Nuclear Black Market, at
http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2001) [hereinafter The Nuclear Black Market] (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also David Satter, Russia's Inner Chaos a Threat to the West, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-I.cfm (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (revealing that the attack on the Tokyo subways using satin gas was perpetrated by the
Japanese Doomsday Sect).
49. See CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, supra note 47, at http://www.fas.org/nukefintro/cw/agent.htm (clarifying
that 'G' agents are much more volatile than 'V' agents).
50. See id. (observing that tightness in the chest is an early symptom of respiratory exposure that gradually
increases as the nerve agents are absorbed into the body).
51. ld.
52. See FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/
intro/bw/intro.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 1998) [hereinafter BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS] (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (revealing that biological warfare poses a new threat to military personnel who were
historically immobilized only by naturally contracted diseases).
53. See id. (adding that with improvements in production methods, as much as 100 times more pathogens
can be produced in each cell than if the pathogen had occurred naturally).
54. See id. (stating that cells that do not normally produce pathogens may be altered to produce pathogens
in order to further biological warfare).
55. See Theodore J. Cieslak & Edward M. Eitzen, Jr., Clinical and Epidemiological Principles of Anthrax,
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that 125,000 people would be infected with anthrax up to three days after fifty
kilograms of anthrax spores were released upwind of a city housing 500,000
people." There are two types of anthrax, cutaneous and inhalation anthrax, with
cutaneous anthrax making up approximately ninety-five percent of human anthrax
cases in the United States.57 The majority of people infected with anthrax shortly
after the world trade center attacks on September 11, 2001 were infected with
cutaneous anthrax.58 Cutaneous anthrax is contracted when bacterial organisms
from infected animal tissue, predominantly cattle, sheep, and goat tissue, 9 gets
underneath the skin. 60 Inhalation anthrax, which has a much higher mortality rate
than cutaneous anthrax, is contracted when the bacterial spores of the anthrax are
inhaled into the lungs.6'
Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction could cause enormous
devastation. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States have elevated
the concern for terrorism. The fact that a terrorist group can cause such
destruction by using box cutters and airplanes62 makes the devastation that could
result from a nuclear attack unimaginable. Although there are no confirmed
accounts of ROC groups stealing weapons of mass destruction, some evidence
suggests that criminal networks will be used to smuggle nuclear, chemical, and
at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/E1D/vol5no4/cieslak.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2002) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (claiming that the fifth and sixth plague in the book of Exodus might have been anthrax, as
well as the disease called "Black Bane" that shot through Europe in the 1600s). 'The threat of an anthrax breakout
has recently resurfaced in 2001." Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, New York City Department of Health,
Update on Anthrax Situation in New York City, http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doh/html/public/presOl/prl071109.
html (Nov. 9, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
56. See Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 55, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/cieslak.htm (adding
that this scenario would also produce 95,000 deaths, which is more than that predicted in any other scenario of a
biological agent release).
57. See FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISIS, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/intro/bw/agent.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that
anthrax is caused by Bacillus anthracis).
58. See Press Release, supra note 55, http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doh/html/public/pres0l/prl071109.
html (indicating that there have been several cases of cutaneous anthrax as opposed to only one case of inhalation
anthrax).
59. See Cieslak & Eitzen, supra note 55, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/cieslak.htm (adding
that close contact of abraded skin with infected herbivores, including hides, wool, and bone, can cause an anthrax
infection).
60. See id. (noting that cutaneous anthrax can be cured by many antibiotics and is rarely fatal),
61. See id. (explaining that the lungs carry the spores to the tracheobronchial or mediastinal lymph nodes
where the organism then grows).
62. See Mike Boettcher, Box Cutters Found on Other September 11 Flights, CNN, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/us/09/23/inv.investigation.terrorisml (Sept. 24, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(stating that accounts from passengers on the planes used in the September 11, 2001 attacks revealed that box
cutters were used by the hijackers to assail the passengers and crew).
63. See Ira Helfand, Effects of a Nuclear Explosion, PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBIUTY, at httpJ/www.
psr.org/Helfand I.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (describing a hypothetical
20-megaton nuclear detonation above a city with a population of 2,800,000 people). Immediately, a fireball would develop
and vaporize everything within a two-mile radius from ground zero. d Effects from the blast would be felt as far as 40
miles from ground zero, leaving over 2,000,000 dead and 500,000 badly injured. Id
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biological materials to terrorist groups in the near future. 64 As a result of this
growing threat, the United States has implemented programs to reduce the
possibility that weapons of mass destruction will be smuggled out of Russia.
This Comment focuses on the United States' efforts to prevent an attack
perpetrated by weapons of mass destruction obtained from the vast stockpile of
weapons stored in Russia. Part II discusses the following treaties between the
United States and Russia: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems ("ABM Treaty"); 65 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I ("START I66,,\67
Treaty"); 66 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II ("START II Treaty"); and
the Moscow Treaty. 6' A discussion of these treaties provides important
background on the United States' and Russia's efforts to prevent the improper
use of weapons of mass destruction. Part III of this Comment offers a brief
history on how the Stalinist era cultivated the beginnings of ROC, and then
explains how the current political and economic conditions in the former Soviet
Union facilitate the spread of ROC groups.69 Part IV discusses measures U.S. law
enforcement agencies are taking in cooperation with other countries to tackle the
worldwide problem of ROC.70 Part IV also discusses the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Act and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, two programs enacted to address
problems with Russia's nuclear facilities.7 Finally, this Comment concludes that
while there are deficiencies in these programs, they have had overall success. The
United States should continue to support these programs in the future as well as
strive for providing greater stability in the facilities that house Russia's weapons
of mass destruction.
64. See U.S. GOVERNMENT, INIERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENP. THE FUrJRE OF NERNATONAL
CRIME, at http://www.terrorism.com/documents/pub45270/pub45270chap5.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2001) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (emphasizing that the theft of weapons of mass destruction by organized crime groups
may become a reality by 2010).
65. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T.
3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
66. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/startl.html [hereinafter START I Treaty] (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
67. Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Russ.,
1993 U.S.T. LEXIS 123 [hereinafter START II Treaty].
68. See infra notes 72-171 and accompanying text (discussing the various treaties that have been enacted
between the United States and Russia in order to reduce Russia's nuclear stockpile and improve relations between
the two countries).
69. See infra notes 172-296 and accompanying text (explaining how ROC emerged from the Gulag prison
camps of the Stalinist era and the threat that ROC groups will use their vast power and wealth to smuggle weapons
of mass destruction from Russia into the hands of rogue states or terrorists).
70. See infra notes 297-346 and accompanying text (focusing on law enforcement programs and
cooperation with Hungarian officials in fighting organized crime that have been created pursuant to U.S.
Presidential Decision Directive 42).
71. See infra notes 347-450 and accompanying text (discussing the progress that the CTR Act and the NCI
have made towards securing Russian facilities that house weapons of mass destruction and reforming Russian
nuclear cities).
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II. THE ELIMINATION OF RUSSIA'S STOCKPILE
At the end of the Cold War, Russia was left with a huge arsenal of weaponsS 72
of mass destruction. Russia has over half of the world's supply of nuclear
materials stockpiled within its borders.7 3 It is home to over 20,000 nuclear
warheads 4 as well as enough plutonium and uranium to make 33,000 nuclear
weapons. 75 These materials along with immense quantities of nuclear waste that
can be used to create crude bombs are housed at fifty different storage facilities
throughout Russia.76 In addition, these facilities store 40,000 tons of chemical
weapons and many biological weapons, including anthrax and smallpox.7 The
stockpiling poses a problem because the security systems in place for these facilities
were designed for a closed society, closed borders, and well-paid workers.
Because these conditions no longer exist in Russia, its weapons of mass
destruction have been left in a vulnerable state. 79 Therefore, there is a danger that
these weapons will be obtained by criminal organizations and then used against
the United States. 80
A. Treaties Aimed at Reducing Russia's Stockpile of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Because of the potential for enormous destruction and devastation, it is
essential that the United States continue to uphold measures to prevent weapons
of mass destruction housed in Russian facilities from falling into the hands of the
U.S. adversaries. Four key treaties have been negotiated between the United
States and Russia to serve this purpose. Each treaty is aimed at reducing the
United States' and Russia's nuclear arsenals, thereby reducing the threat that
72. See Ong, supra note 6, at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/issues/nuclearweapons-states.html.
73. Global Nuclear Stockpile: 1945-1997, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at
http://www. bullatomsci.org/issues/nukenotes/nd97nukenote.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
74. The Nuclear Black Market, supra note 48, at http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf. A warhead is
defined as "the forward section of a self-propelled missile, bomb, torpedo, or the like, containing the explosive,
chemical, or atomic charge." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2142 (2d ed. 1993).
75. Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-1.cfm.
76. See id. (adding that crude bombs are capable of contaminating large areas). See generally INTERNATIONAL
PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, CRUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROLIFERATION AND THE
TERRORISTTHREAT(1996) (explaining the science and social policy surrounding the creation and use of crude bombs).
77. Satter, supra note 48, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-I.cfm.
78. See Matthew Bunn, A Detailed Analysis of the Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and
Fissile Material, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 74
(Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000) (discussing that even the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy has noticed Russia's
increasing inability to manage the nuclear material).
79. See id. (maintaining that because of the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the declining economic
conditions, none of the facilities housing the weapons of mass destruction are adequately safeguarded).
80. See Cirincione, supra note 16, at 2 (stating that although Americans do not fear a nuclear attack from
the Russian government, there is still a real threat that weapons of mass destruction will be used by criminals on a
much smaller but still deadly scale).
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these weapons will fall into the wrong hands and then be used against the United
States. However, two of the treaties were terminated as a result of the United
States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001." Regardless of the current
status of the treaties, they have collectively helped to achieve a significant reduction
in Russia's stockpile of weapons and have led to further cooperative measures
between the United States and Russia.82
1. Limitation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty
President George W. Bush" officially terminated the ABM Treaty on December
14, 2001. 84 However, the ABM Treaty was the first non-proliferation treaty
negotiated between the United States and Russia during the Cold War, serving as a
groundbreaking advancement towards cooperation between the United States and
Russia." The ABM Treaty was enacted on October 3, 1972.86
The ABM Treaty was created to stop the nuclear arms race between the
United States and the former USSR by denying both signatories ballistic missile
defense systems.87 The Treaty essentially served two purposes. First, it prevented
the necessity of developing new weapons to defeat existing missile defense
systems. 88 Second, it assisted in the stabilization of the relationship between the
two countries during the Cold War.89 Therefore, the ABM Treaty served as a
deterrence system, promoting solidarity between the United States and Russia by
working towards a common goal of non-proliferation.
81. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Statement on the Achievement of the Final Reductions Under the
START Treaty (Dec. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Powell Statement].
82. Philipp C. Bleek, Russia Ratifies START 11, Extension Protocol; ABM-Related Agreements also
Approved, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (May 2000), at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-05/ru I maOO.asp (last
visited Dec. 13, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Land-Based Strategic Weapons: SS-
18 Satan (RS-20), RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARSENAL, at http://pages.infinit.net/bladel/russia.htm#ss18 (last updated
Nov. 16, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (adding that the United States has sponsored the
dismantlement of many SS-18 missiles, despite the demise of the START 11 Treaty, with the expectation of
eliminating all SS- 18 missiles by 2010).
83. All further references to President Bush refer to U.S. President George W. Bush, unless otherwise
stated.
84. See Barry Schweid, U.S. Quits Arms Treaty-War on Terror: Where Is Osama, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Sydney), Dec. 14, 2001, at 5 (asserting that President Bush withdrew from the ABM Treaty because it prevented
the United States from developing effective defense systems).
85. See Frank Gaffney & John Pike, Online Q & A: The ABM Treaty, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/military/jan-june99/nmdqa.html (Feb. 2, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the
primary purpose of the ABM Treaty was to assist the United States and Russia with cooperative arms control
agreements).
86. ABM Treaty, supra note 65.
87. Curbs Under the ABM Treaty, STRArrs TIMES (Sing.), Dec. 14, 2001, at 22.
88. A Frightening Retreat from Arms Leadership, F2 NETWORK, at http://old.smh.com.au/news/112/27/
opinion/opinion2.html (Dec. 27, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
89. Id.
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The ABM Treaty was amended in May of 19 76 .9' Under the Protocol to the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("ABM Protocol"), each country
was limited to one anti-ballistic missile system deployment area, with a required
radius of 150 kilometers. 9' Originally, the countries could deploy anti-ballistic
missile systems in an area centered on the party's respective national capital and
in an area containing intercontinental ballistic missile silo launchers. 9' However,
under the ABM Protocol, the parties were limited to choosing one of the two
previously available areas. 93 In addition, the ABM Protocol limited each
signatory to only one hundred anti-ballistic missile launchers and one hundred
anti-ballistic interceptor missiles.94 Furthermore, the anti-ballistic missile launchers
could not be capable of rapid reload or have the ability to fire more than one
interceptor at a time.9' Finally, neither party could develop, test, or deploy sea-
based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based anti-ballistic missile
systems.9' Therefore, the ABM Protocol further limited the ability of each
country to develop and maintain anti-ballistic missile defense systems.
The ABM Treaty originally served as a deterrence system by threatening
retaliation.9 Because neither the United States nor Russia could deploy unlimited
defenses against a ballistic missile attack, each nation was deterred from
initiating an attack on the other.98 However, the end of the Cold War undermined
the purposes of the ABM Treaty.99 In addition, the United States faces new
threats from rogue states and unstable outlaw groups pursuing nuclear weapons
capabilities.' ° Although the ABM Treaty was successful in reducing the number
of operational anti-ballistic missile launch sites in Russia,'0 ' the Treaty prevented
90. Protocol to the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, U.S.-Russ., 27 U.S.T. 1645
[hereinafter ABM Protocol].
91. Id.
92. ABM Treaty, supra note 65.
93. ABM Protocol, supra note 90.
94. Id.
95. See Curbs Under the ABM Treaty, supra note 87 (reaffirming that launchers, interceptors, and radars
are all part of an ABM system used to counter ballistic missiles).
96. Id.
97. Arms Control and the U.S.-Russian Relationship, The ABM Treaty and Ballistic Missile Defense, at
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/cfr...nc-4.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Arms Control] (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer).
98. See id. (explaining that the deterrence for launching an attack came from the overwhelming threat of
retaliation and the inability to commence an adequate defense due to the ABM Treaty).
99. See id. (stating that the United States and Russia no longer fear a nuclear attack from one another).
100. Jesse Helms, Amend the ABM Treaty? No, Scrap It, at http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/
helm0199.htm (Jan. 22, 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); see also Nick Childs, Analysis:
The New Bogeymen, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/1376425.htm (Dec. 12, 2001) (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the term 'rogue state' usually refers to developing countries
that are hostile towards the United States). Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea are among the key states that
continue to be a concern to the United States. Id.; see also Janusz Bugajski, Next Stages of the Global War, at
http://www.nacional. hr/htm/310053.en.htm (Oct. 25, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(adding that the A1-Qaeda network, the Taliban, and the Russian Mafia all pose a threat to the United States).
101. See Arms Control, supra note 97, at http://www.fas.orglspp/eprint/cfr-nc_4.htm.
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the United States from deploying missile defense systems that would provide
safety from nuclear attacks originating elsewhere. ir
As a result of these changed conditions, President Bush invoked Article 15 of
the ABM Treaty in December of 200L.'°3 In accordance with Article 15, President
Bush gave Russia notice that the United States was formally withdrawing from
the ABM Treaty.'O° Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that this decision
came as no surprise, but Russia "nevertheless considers it a mistake. ' °5 One of
the most predominant reasons President Bush decided to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty was because the Treaty was outdated.' °6 According to President
Bush, "[t]he Cold War is long gone. Today [the United States] leave[s] behind
one of its last vestiges."'° In light of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United
States, President Bush believes the ABM Treaty precludes the nation from
creating an effective defense system to protect against terrorists and rogue states
who may strike without warning.'O' As a result, President Bush intends to build amissile defense system that would have violated the terms of the ABM Treaty.,°9
2. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (I)
Although the AMB Treaty set out initial limitations on the use of strategic
arms, the START I Treaty was the first treaty to actually reduce the number of
strategic offensive weapons, resulting in overall reductions of thirty to forty
percent. Although the START I Treaty began as a bilateral treaty between the
102. See Helms, supra note 100, at http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/ helmO199.htm (stating that while
the original ABM Treaty limited each side to two ABM launch sites, a 1974 amendment reduced the number to one
site).
103. ABM Treaty, supra note 65, at art. 15. Article 15 of the ABM Treaty reads as follows:
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Id.
104. See Schweid, supra note 84 (adding that formal notice was given to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
who are all successor states to the former Soviet Union along with Russia).
105. Id. (stating that Russia's Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, said that the decision was regrettable, but
that he was not worried about the security of Russia).
106. See John Diamond, Missile Pact on Brink: U.S. Says Imminent Testing May Violate ABM Treaty, CHt.
TRIB., July 13, 2001, at 1.
107. Schweid, supra note 84 (reiterating that President Bush had consulted with his top advisors before
making the decision). "This is not a day for looking back. This is a day for looking forward with hope of greater
prosperity and peace. We're moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation." Id.
108. See id. (emphasizing that defending the American people is President Bush's highest priority).
109. See Diamond, supra note 106 (uncovering a plan to begin construction on a testing base in Alaska that
could eventually be used as a missile launch site).
110. See Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Dep't of State, START Treaty Final Reductions, at http://www.
state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?docid=6669 (Dec. 5, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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United States and the former USSR, it has defaulted into a multi-lateral treaty...
between the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as a result of
the break up of the Soviet Union."' START I has brought about a reduction in both
the United States' and Russia's nuclear warheads arsenal from over 10,000 to
6000."' U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet Union President Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty in Moscow in July of 1991.114 It was ratified
in December of 1994.11
Under the START I Treaty, both countries had seven years to complete their
- • 116
required reductions. Furthermore, all nuclear warheads and strategic offensive
weapons had to be completely removed from Belaraus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
within this time period."' This was achieved on December 5, 2001. "8 However,
the successful reduction of all required weapons did not mark the end of the
START I Treaty." 9 Rather, the Treaty has inspection and verification provisions
that will remain in force until December 2009.'20 These provisions include the
right to make on-sight inspections, obtain updates, and receive information on the
other party's strategic systems.12" ' In addition, it assists each party in maintaining
confidence in the other party's continued compliance with the Treaty. Similar
to the ABM Treaty's provision requiring a Standing Consultative Commission to/. .• 123
promote the implementation of all objectives, the START I Treaty provides for
a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to ensure the continued effectiveness
of its implementation.1
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1036 (7th ed. 1999) (defining multilateral as "involving more than
two parties").
112. See Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 110, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?
docid=6669 (clarifying that before the START I Treaty was ratified, several years of continued negotiation ensued
in order to modify the treaty into a multi-lateral structure). Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are legal
successors to the Soviet Union. Id.
113. Powell Statement, supra note 81.
114. START I Treaty, supra note 66.
115. Id.
116. See id. (explaining that the terms of the START I Treaty require compliance within seven years of the
ratification date).
117. Id.
118. See Powell Statement, supra note 81 (pronouncing "[t]he treaty's final ceilings came into effect
[Dec. 5, 2001] and they have been met").
119. Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 110, at http://www.state.gov/tlac/rls/fs/200I/index.cfm?docid
=6669.
120. See START I Treaty, supra note 66, at art. XVII (stating that while the treaty shall remain in force for
only 15 years, the 15-year duration may be extended for successive five-year terms by agreement from all parties).
121. Id.
122. See id. (articulating that "a significant aspect of the START Treaty's regime lies in its use of
rigorous, equitable and verifiable methods to monitor implementation").
123. ABM Treaty, supra note 65 (stating that the Standing Consultative Commission agrees upon
procedures for dismantling anti-ballistic missile systems and considers proposals for further compliance with the
treaty, among other things).
124. See Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 110, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/200l/index.cfm?
docid=6669 (asserting that the parties to the treaty will continue to meet with the Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission in order to resolve issues of compliance and further implementation).
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Because of these built-in protections, the START I Treaty has played a
significant role in the reduction of nuclear weapons from the Cold War era."'
Although required reductions under the START I Treaty were successfullyS. 126
completed, decreasing the number of strategic offensive arms became desirable
• 27
for all parties involved. Consequently, before the START I Treaty was even
entered into force, negotiations for the START II Treaty ensued.1"
3. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (II)
Although the START II Treaty was designed to build upon the START I
Treaty,"' it was never legally enacted."3 The United States approved the initial
START II Treaty in 1996,3' but the Russian Duma'32 refused to ratify it.'33 Russian
officials then attempted to amend the START I Treaty in 1997.134 The Protocol to
the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
("1997 Protocol") would have extended the date to complete weapons reductions
by five years, making the new deadline December 31, 2007. 13 More significantly,
the 1997 Protocol included a memorandum of understanding linking ratification of
the START II Treaty to the United States' continued adherence to the ABM
Treaty. 136 On May 4, 2000, Russia ratified the START H Treaty along with the
1997 Protocol.37 However, the United States never ratified the Treaty because it
did not approve of the 1997 Protocol. Therefore, the START II Treaty had no
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. START 11 Treaty, supra note 67.
128. Bleek, supra note 82, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/ru lmaOO.asp.
129. See START II Treaty, supra note 67 (holding that the START I Treaty surpasses the
accomplishments of the START I Treaty by further increasing the stability of the strategic nuclear balance).
130. See Charles Digges, Russia and America Formally Scrap START II, ABM Treaty, BELLONA, at
http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke-weapons/start/24686.html (June 16, 2002) (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
131. Baker Spring, Accept No Russian Conditions to START H Treaty, HERITAGE, at http://www.
heritage.org/library/execmemo/em561 .html (Dec. 4, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
132. See Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Russia
(Nov. 2001), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=3183 (last visited Dec. 3, 2001) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the Duma is Russia's legislative branch of government).
133. See Bleek, supra note 82, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/ru I maOO.asp (explaining that
ratification by the Duma failed because many members believed that Russia had already compromised too
much in the treaty).
134. Id.
135. See id. (stating that the 1997 Protocol was reached at the United States-Russian summit that was
held in Helsinki in order to encourage Russian ratification of the treaty).
136. See id. (asserting that the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine also signed a
memorandum of understanding clarifying the demarcation lines between strategic missiles and theater missiles
at the 1997 Helsinki summit).
137. See id. (clarifying that "Article 9 of the Russian resolution of ratification specifically makes
exchange of the instruments of ratification, the final step required to bring the treaty into force, contingent of
Senate approval of the 1997 agreements").
138. See The 1997 START/ABM Package at a Glance, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pack.
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legally binding effect because both nations ratified different versions of the
Treaty.'"
While the START II Treaty was never enacted, continued negotiations
surrounding the Treaty illustrate both the United States' and Russia's desire to
reach an agreement regarding non-proliferation.'4 The START II Treaty
prohibited all deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with
multiple targetable nuclear warheads.41  Furthermore, the supply of warheads
was to be reduced to an amount between 3000 and 3500 by December 31,
2007.142 One of the ultimate goals of the START II Treaty was the total
elimination of all SS-18 missiles, 43 or heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and either the elimination or conversion of their launchers. 44 Thus, reductions
under the START II Treaty would have been significant had the Treaty been
enforced.
The day after the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty became
effective, Russia formally withdrew its support for the START II Treaty.
45
Defense analysts in Moscow claim that Russia's withdrawal was a mere formality,
given that the START II Treaty was superceded by the Moscow Treaty, which
was signed by U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin in May 2002.'
46
Russian officials also believe that the withdrawal was a formality because the
START II Treaty was linked to the United States' continued adherence to the
asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (pronouncing that the Clinton
administration failed to submit the agreements to the Senate for approval, and it is unlikely that they will be
submitted under the Bush administration).
139. Charles Digges, supra note 130, at http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russialnukeweapons/
start/ 24686.html.
140. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions
in Nuclear Forces, available at http://fas.org/nuke/control/start2/text/helsinkistate.htm (Mar. 21, 1997) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (illustrating that the United States and Russia remain committed to a reduction of
the nuclear stockpile in order to provide safety and security to both Americans and Russians); see also Major
LeWonnie E. Belcher, Modifications to START 11 Treaty Now Need U.S. Review, at http://airforce.dtic.mil/
news/Apr2000/n20000427_000635.html (Apr. 27, 2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
141. START I Treaty, supra note 67.
142. See Protocol to the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Sept. 26,
1997, U.S.-Russ., http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/star2/text/protocol.htm (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (clarifying that the original deadline of January 1, 2003 was extended to December 31, 2007 by the 1997
protocol); see also START 11 Treaty, supra note 67 (stating that "[w]ithin this, there are sub limits of between
1,700-1,750 warheads on deployed SLMBs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] for each Party ... ; zero for
warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and zero for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs").
143. See Land-Based Strategic Weapons: SS-18 Satan (RS-20), supra note 82, at http://pages.infinit.
net/bladel/russia.htm#ssl8 (describing that the Russian SS-18 (Satan) is an ICBM that was deployed in 1975
and represents the fourth generation of Russian ICBMs). The SS-18 weighs 211,200 kilograms and measures
36.5 meters in length and three meters in diameter. Id.
144. See START 11 Treaty, supra note 67 (emphasizing that the START II Treaty provides for the
conversion of 90 of the SS- 18 missiles that will remain after the initial reductions from the START I Treaty).
145. See Caroline Wyatt, Russia Abandons START 11 Arms Treaty, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/2044941.stm (June 14, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (claiming
that Russia called the START II Treaty "meaningless" in light of the United States' withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty).
146. See id. (asserting that the START II Treaty has been "dead in the water" for a long time).
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ABM Treaty.14 1 Ultimately, Russia's withdrawal had a limited effect because the
United States never ratified the 1997 Protocol, preventing the Treaty from ever
having a legally binding effect.' Therefore, the lack of an enforceable treaty to
restrict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction led the United States and
Russia to search for a new agreement addressing this problem.
4. The Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions)
On May 14, 2002, the United States and Russia signed a formal treaty to
reduce strategic offensive weapons.14  Although the Bush Administration was
content with an executive agreement between the two nations, Russia was
adamant on having a formal treaty.,"0 One reason for the formality was the United
States' plan to reduce nuclear warheads through the process of downloading,
rather than dismantlement.'' Through the process of downloading, the warheads
would be removed from the weapons and stored, allowing the United States and
Russia to retain the ability to reconstruct the weapons if necessary. 5 2 Russia
found downloading to be a problem and suggested eliminating warheads or
delivery vehicles5 3 instead. 4 Ultimately, both sides compromised, and the United
States agreed to give Russia three months' notice before the warheads would be
returned to the delivery vehicles."' The Moscow Treaty aims to reduce each
nation's stockpile of nuclear warheads by approximately sixty-five percent, bringing
the number of warheads in each nation to between 1700 and 2200. 56
147. See Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Withdraws from Defunct START 11 Nuclear Treaty, at
http://www. freerepublic.com/focus/news/700214/posts (June 14, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (noting that the ABM Treaty expired because the Untied States withdrew from the treaty in order to
pursue a national missile defense system).
148. See Digges, supra note 130, at http://www.bellona.no/en/internationallrussialnukeweapons/startl
24686.html (suggesting that Russian President Putin withdrew from the START 11 Treaty simply to make a point to
the United States that Russia will not be "rolled over").
149. The Moscow Treaty (Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions), May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russ., 41 I.L.M.
799 [hereinafter Moscow Treaty]; see also Nikolai Sokov, "START III": An End or Beginning of Negotiations, at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020513.htm (May 13, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating
that the START II agreement will be short and simple).
150. See Kelly Wallace et. al., U.S., Russia Agree to Reduce Nuclear Arms, at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/US/05/13/bush.nuclear/ (May 14, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the
Bush administration agreed to the formal nature of the treaty because it embodied their policy on nuclear
reduction). Reference to Bush in this context applies to George W. Bush.
151. See Sokov, supra note 149, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020513.htm (emphasizing that Russia
does not have the means to retain as many of its weapons delivery vehicles as the United States does).
152. See id. (maintaining that the United States had the capabilities to reconstruct its nuclear arsenal to
about 5,000 warheads, should the need arise).
153. See id. (identifying delivery vehicles as missiles and bombers that carry warheads).
154. See id. (explaining that even though the United States was already planning to retire some of its
delivery vehicles and warheads, neither suggestion pleased the United States).
155. Id.
156. See Wallace, supra note 150, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/13/bush.nuclear/ (noting that both
the United States and Russia currently have between 5000 and 6000 warheads).
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Two debated topics still under negotiation are transparency and verification.'57
Pursuant to the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to
implement programs strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in
each nation's defense system.' This includes the exchange of information
regarding missile defense systems, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense
testing, and possibly the creation of a joint center for the exchange of information
from early warning centers. 9 Verification of the storage or dismantlement of
warheads is not an easy process to establish and will require a large amount of
time." Nevertheless, the decision by U.S. President Bush and Russian President
Putin to sign the agreement while still in a simplistic format shows the two
nations' willingness to build a new relationship and strive towards the reduction
of nuclear weapons.16  Though the Moscow Treaty will not serve as a
replacement for the ABM Treaty,' 6' it is expected to implement non-proliferation
through cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability.
63
The United States has made it clear on more than one occasion that it remains
committed to multilateral establishments furthering non-proliferation and
international security.' 64 This may seem puzzling to those who criticize President
Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. 65 While Russian President
Putin considered the United States' withdrawal a mistake,' 66 the newly signed
Moscow Treaty illustrates that the withdrawal has not suppressed President Putin's
willingness to cooperate with the United States on non-proliferation issues.'67 The
Moscow Treaty achieves an important political mission by strengthening the
cooperative environment between the United States and Russia and working
157. See Sokov, supra note 149, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020513.htm (adding that if and when the
two nations agree on transparency and verification provisions for the treaty, it will no longer be a short and simple
document).
158. Moscow Treaty, supra note 149.
159. See id. (expressing the view that there will be further exploration into opportunities for cooperation
between the two nations for missile defense in Europe).
160. See Sokov, supra note 149, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020513.htm (explaining that there was
not enough time before the 2002 Summit to negotiate an adequate verification process).
161. See id. (emphasizing that although the agreement has not been finalized, it is a good sign that the two
nations decided to continue negotiations instead of abandoning the Moscow Treaty).
162. See Wallace, supra note 150, at http://www.cnn.com/2002IUS/05/13/bush.nuclear/ (conveying doubts
that this treaty will ever have the ability to replace the strength of the ABM Treaty).
163. See Moscow Treaty, supra note 149 (stressing that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies
and will cooperate with each other in order to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction).
164. See Alexander G. Higgins, U.S. Defends Stand on Arms Treaties; Summit Reminded of Terror Threats,
CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 25, 2002, at 6 (stressing the fact that many states that sponsor terrorism are actively pursuing
weapons of mass destruction, and the chance of a nuclear attack is now a realistic and grave threat to the United
States).
165. See ABM Treaty Withdrawal an Attack on American Security, U.S. NEWSWRE, at http://www.usnewswire.
com/topnews/CurrentReleases/1213-147.html (Dec. 13, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating the
irony of taking an action opposed by our allies, while at the same time realizing the need for international cooperation).
166. See Schweid, supra note 84 (explaining that Russia feared a new arms race would be generated by the
United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty).
167. See Wallace, supra note 150, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/13/bush.nuclear/ (presenting a
landmark treaty between the United States and Russia that will reduce both countries' nuclear arsenals).
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towards full transparency with regard to the stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction.' 6 The reality is that many of Russia's weapons of mass destruction
will remain in Russia for years to come despite the efforts of the United States,
making it important to remove any misperceptions and suspicions surrounding the
169
weapons.
As the Moscow Treaty is still under negotiation, it is too early to determine
the effects that the Treaty will have on the reduction of Russia's stockpile of
weapons. Although the treaties when taken together have facilitated cooperation
between the United States and Russia and have successfully reduced Russia's
stockpile of weapons, more needs to be done. It is important to find a strategy
that will be successful not only in reducing Russia's stockpile, but in securing the
facilities that house these weapons and eventually eliminating the risks associated
with the theft of the weapons.•70 ROC groups are adding to that risk, as they have
begun to show an interest in buying and selling nuclear weapons from poorly
guarded, overstocked storage facilities in Russia.7' Thus, the United States must
realize the imminent threat posed by ROC to the safety of the nation, and it must
implement programs that will prevent ROC groups from smuggling weapons out
of Russia.
III. THE POTENTIAL THREAT THAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WILL BE SMUGGLED OUT OF RUSSIA BY RUSSIAN
ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS
In December of 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen independent
republics. 7 1 Suddenly, the authoritarian social and political control of the
communist' rule was gone, and in its place, a struggling democratic political
system began to emerge.1 74 Regrettably, ROC groups were in the best position to
take advantage of the democratic system and utilize the newly supported private
enterprises, which were previously forbidden in the Soviet Union.' 7 ROC members
168. See Sokov, supra note 149, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020513.htm (conveying that the decision
to begin negotiations on transparency and verification defuses the highly debated topic of arms control).
169. See id. (advising that the agreement signed by President Bush and President Putin is hoped to create a
more open environment between the two nations).
170. See Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-I.cfm (emphasizing
that parts of Russia are under the complete control of organized crime).
171. Task Force Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Relevance of Russian Organized
Crime (1997), at http://www.csis.org/goc/pubs.htm#pubs (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
172. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACIBOOK, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/rs.htmI (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
173. See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 414 (2d ed. 1993) (defining communism as "a
system of social organization in which all economic and social activity is controlled by a totalitarian state
dominated by a single and self perpetuating political party").
174. See id. (stating that the authoritarian control of the Soviet Union began to erode when Mikhail
Gorbachev came into power in 1985). Gorbachev initiated two programs called glasnost (openness) and perestroika
(restructuring), which attempted to open up the economy and renovate communism. Id.
175. See JAMES 0. FINCKENAUER & YURI A. VORONtN, THE THREAT OF RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME 7
(Nat'l Inst. of Justice ed., 2001) (describing how corrupt officials in the Communist Party, who were aware that the
Soviet Union was about to fall, began to subtly divert government funds into banks and other companies).
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began to act as business entities, providing goods and services to other unorganized
criminals who lacked the ability to attain market power.76 ROC creates one of the
greatest potential threats to the United States because of its ability to smuggle weapons
of mass destruction out of Russia and then sell them to terrorist organizations. 7
Understanding the history behind ROC is the key to identifying its motives and its
strengths. In addition, the history of ROC illustrates the threat it poses to the
United States and highlights that it is necessary for the United States to eliminate
the problem of ROC in order to preserve its safety.
A. A Brief History of Russian Organized Crime Groups
Although ROC began to appear more frequently after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, there is no doubt that ROC materialized long before 1991.78
During the Stalinist era beginning in the late 1920s, 79 a professional class of
criminals developed in the Soviet Gulag prisons. 18 These groups are bound
together by "adopted behaviors, rules, values, and sanctions." 8' Unlike other
criminal groups who are traditionally organized according to ethnicity or family
composition, ROC members center on the dependence on fellow crime conspirators
with a mutual respect for one another.'82 These criminals are bound together in a
group called the "Thieves' World",'" which is led by a faction called the "vory v
zakone."'8 The leaders of the "vory v zakone are portrayed like godfather-like
figures."' This group is the most sophisticated of all professional criminals and
refuses to conform to the law.'86 The vory v zakone have developed a deep trust
176. See Robert Heilman, Russian Organized Crime: An Impetus or Impediment to Political and Economic
Progress?, at http://www.dushkin.com/connectextlecon/chl7/article.mhtm (last visited Sept. 21, 2002) (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (asserting that organized crime groups traditionally dominate the market by
buying illicit products below the market price, and then selling the products above the competitive price).
177. See id. (admitting that ROC involvement in this trade is disputed).
178. FINCKENAUER& VORONIN, supra note 175, at 7.
179. See FRED CoLEMAN, THE DECUNE AND FALL OF THE SOvIET UNION 23 (1996) (indicating that
although Stalin proposed a policy of "Socialism in one Country," Stalin had an ulterior motive of eliminating all of
his rivals and taking over both the Communist party and the Soviet Government). Under Stalin's rule, the citizens
of the Soviet Union had no power to make any decisions and would be executed if they chose to go against Stalin's
command. Id. at 14.
180. See FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 5 (describing how Soviet prisons fulfilled the role
that ethnicity played in organized crime groups in the United States).
181. Id.
182. See id. (contrasting ROC groups to organized crime groups in the United States, which are primarily
united by ethnicity).
183. See Dantsik S. Baldaev et al., Russian Mafia, at http://www.gangland.net/russianmafia.htm (last
revised July 1I, 2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the 'Thieves World' must
abide by a traditional code of conduct). If any of the 18 codes are broken, the punishment is death. id.
184. See id. (proclaiming that the vory v zakone is an elitist group who creates and maintains a truthful
environment among the criminal members so that the activities of the ROC groups can be effectively carried out).
185. Phil Williams, Russian Organized Crime: The New Threat?, 2 TRANSNAT'L ORGANIZED CRIME 178,
181 (1996).
186. See id. at 197 (clarifying that "[t]he association of vory is a rather loose structure with little
differentiation among its members, and with the elite being just the first among equals").
2002 / Weapons of Mass Destruction Stockpiled in Russia
amongst themselves, an essential element for the successful operation of criminals
that must conspire in order to carry out their activities.187 As a result of its power,
the vory v zakone are considered leaders among the different ROC groups."'
The ROC members operating in the shadow economy created a black market
fostered by the former USSR's disproportionate supply and demand economy in
the 1970s.5 9 Under Leonid Brezhnev's rule, the shadow, or underground, economy
came into existence.'9 Brezhnev is considered by many scholars to have
established the connection between criminal organizations and public officials.' 9'
The shadow economy consisted of "underground businessmen, who amassed wealth
by siphoning off funds from the state budget for lucrative private ventures."'' g ROC
members bribed government officials in return for their cooperation in the
underground economy.' 93 It was not difficult for government officials to get away
with this illegal behavior for two reasons.'9 First, government workers were given
official immunity under the existing law.' 9' Second, there were no anticorruption
laws in the former USSR.' 96 Because all of the former USSR's wealth and assets
were vested in the state, it was easy for Communist party officials to access the
state's money for use in illegal ventures. 9 In essence, the country's wealth and
assets were sold out from under its citizens, with almost no accountability from the
government.
An additional factor contributing to the creation of the shadow economy was
the establishment of a wage increase during the Brezhnev administration.'9' Eager
consumers who found themselves with more money to spend, but not enough
187. See FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 5-6 (establishing that the vory v zakone created a
climate of trust necessary to carry out organized criminal activities).
188. See Crime in Russia, ANNENBERG/CPB PROJECT (1997), at http://www.harpercollege.edu/mhealy/
gl01ilec/russia/ruh/ruhnow/transitn2.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (adding that there are approximately 239 vory v zakone members worldwide).
189. Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for
Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 72 (1995).
190. Sara Jankiewicz, Comment, Glasnost and the Growth of Global Organized Crime, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 215, 229 (1995).
191. See Keith E. Henderson, Halfway Home and a Long Way to Go, in 8 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA NO. 4
(2000), http://iicas.org/english/krsten-12_01_01.htm (Dec. 1, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(stating that corrupt public officials used public institutions as a front for personal gain).
192. Jankiewicz, supra note 190, at 229.
193. See id. (claiming that government officials, businessmen, and organized crime members all worked
together, with the businessmen paying the crime lords a certain percentage for protection and the crime lords
paying the corrupt officials for their collaboration).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See id. (noting that a later investigation in 1988 found 17 high ranking officials, including Brezhnev's
son-in-law, guilty of accepting over one million dollars in bribes).
198. See id. at 230 (adding that it was difficult to trace the decline of the former Soviet Union's wealth due
to the elevated level of corruption).
199. See McGrory, supra note 189, at 72 (stating that the underground economy was derived from the
following two developments: the demand for more consumption by workers and a shortage of quality consumable
goods in the 1970s and 1980s).
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products to satisfy their demands, fostered the success of the shadow economy.200
As a result of the consumer goods shortage, underground production and
distribution of products began to emerge.0' The shortage was fueled by the
insufficiency of the former USSR's centralized planning and the low priority
given to consumer goods.07 The underground economy became a foundation for
citizens of the former USSR, including those who have previously never been
involved in illegal activity. °3
The underground economy created a distorted association between state
officials, businessmen, and professional organized crime groups." Eventually,
these three groups merged into a pyramid of organized crime.0 5 At the top of the
pyramid sits the corrupt state officials who exploit their positions of power by
facilitating and protecting criminal activity. 6 The second layer of the pyramid is
made up of underground or shadow economy members who use their connections or
employment with production companies for illegal benefits. 2°7 For example,
factory workers have overestimated their production needs, ordered the raw
materials to meet that inflated requirement, and then sold the excess materials at a
profit."" The last layer of the pyramid is made up of specialized criminals who
commit the illegal acts, including drug running, gambling, and prostitution.2?, The
crime groups that began in the Stalinist era grew during Brezhnev's rule, uniting
200. See id. (stating that the economy suffered from a shortage of goods and a large amount of forced
savings).
201. Id. (mentioning that the military consumed approximately 25% of the consumer goods, and a
majority of other production went into capital or productive goods, including steel, raw materials, and energy).
202. See id. (discussing how the underground economy took advantage of the shortcomings in the
Communist Party's central plan and govemment-capped prices).
203. See id. (finding the private industrialists in the underground economy were able to offer consumers
more choices).
204. See Jankiewicz, supra note 190, at 229 (referring to the underground economy as an "unholy
alliance").
205. See FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 6 (stating that "contemporary Russian organized
crime grew out of the Soviet 'nomenklatura' system (the government's organizational structure and high-level
officials) in which some individual 'apparatchiks' (government bureaucrats) developed mutually beneficial
personal relationships with the thieves world").
206. Id.; see also Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rob Boone, Statement Before the Commission of
Security and Cooperation in Europe (Mar. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Boone Statement]; see also Assistant Attorney
General James Robinson (Criminal Division), Testimony Before the Banking and Financial Services House
Committee (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/bribes/robinson4.htm (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (adding that although not a new concept, the corruption of government officials by
ROC members is a serious problem).
207. FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 6; see also Task Force Report, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Russian Organized Crime, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/hockey/
mafia/csis.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that Russian
crime groups consist of "businessmen for whom existing Russian law, and Western norms of commerce, are simply
obstacles to be overcome in one way or another").
208. Mike Gallagher, Tax Evasion, Corruption Hurt Economy, at http://www.abqjoural.comlnewsl
russia/2rusl 1-25.htm (Nov. 25, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
209. See id. (showing that the bottom layer of the pyramid consists of the criminals who became bound
together while serving time in the Soviet prisons).
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corrupt businessmen with government officials. 2' ROC groups consisting of
criminals from the vory v zakone and the shadow economy continue to gain
momentum, and have virtually exploded with newfound power now that Communist
rule has been replaced with enterprise privatization.21
In 1992, the Communist Soviet system gave way to the Russian government's
privatization approach."'2 Unfortunately, the vast amount of wealth and assets
acquired by the criminal groups that emerged from the shadow economy made
the exploitation of privatization easy."1 3 In essence, the shadow economy emerged
from beneath the trenches and began to steal for their own benefit rather than for
the state's benefit.114 At this point, ROC groups had the ability to deal with the state
on equal footing. 2"5 They began to control who entered the business market,
imposed taxes, and exploited tariffs. 216 More importantly, ROC groups had the
power to demand compliance through the use of violence and coercion.2" Because
ROC groups have risen from the depths of a nation bearing half of the world's
supply of nuclear weapons, ROC presents a particular threat to the nuclear
weapons smuggling business."1 8 Although ROC has not yet played a major role in
nuclear smuggling, the FBI recognizes that it is only a matter of time until ROC
groups make a big entrance into the market. 29 Thus, it is necessary for the United
States to assist Russia with securing the nuclear facilities that house these weapons.
B. Inadequate Protection of Russia's Nuclear Facilities
The deteriorating standard of living in Russia and the many poorly guarded
nuclear cities could lead to a potential nuclear disaster."O Underpaid and overworked
employees at nuclear power plants are prime targets for crime groups and other
corrupt entrepreneurs aspiring to gain access to nuclear materials because it is not
uncommon for workers to leave these weapons unprotected.7 2' Thus, the workers
210. McGrory, supra note 189, at 72.
211. Heilman, supra note 176, at http://www.dushkin.com/connectext/econ/ch 17/article.mhtml.
212. See FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 7 (stating that privatization expanded the complex
relationship between the state and organized crime because they were both in a good position to obtain public
property). Public property, formerly held by the state, was now available for purchase by private investors. Id.
213. See id. (adding that the assets held by organized crime gave the shadow economy great economic and
political power).
214. Jankiewicz, supra note 190, at 231.
215. FINCKENAUER & VORONIN, supra note 175, at 7.
216. See id. (noting that organized crime assumed some of the basic functions of the government).
217. Id.
218. David Phinney, Russian Mafia Poses Threat, at http://www.more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/
russia930/ (Sept. 29, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
219. See id. (claiming that although there has been no evidence linking ROC groups to nuclear smuggling,
the weakening government authority in Russia and the now worldwide operations of ROC heightens the chance
that ROC groups will engage in trafficking nuclear arms).
220. The Nuclear Black Market, supra note 48, at http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf.
221. See id. (implying that these underpaid workers may permit nuclear weapons to come into the
possession of terrorists for the right price).
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create a situation where weapons of mass destruction can easily fall into the
wrong hands. In 1996, there was a strike at a nuclear power plant in St. Petersburg
involving over four hundred dissatisfied workers who were not receiving paychecks.
2
Although the Russian government was able to remedy that situation, the strike
illustrates the instability of some of the employees who are supposed to be
safeguarding Russia's weapons of mass destruction.223 Furthermore, the nuclear
facilities lack the equipment and technology necessary to secure the weapons.224
In 1995, an American visitor to one of Russia's nuclear facilities found highly
enriched uranium stored in cabinets protected with bicycle locks.2'
A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies Task Force
("CSIS Task Force") reveals that people who attempt to steal nuclear weaponsS226
are typically opportunistic amateurs with no previous criminal record. However,
227these people believe they must steal in order to survive economic destitution. In
addition to employees with access to nuclear materials, these thieves include
friends and relatives of current employees, former employees with insider knowledge,
and Russian citizens familiar with the vulnerable state of Russia's nuclear storage
facilities.22' Once the thieves have gained access to nuclear materials, a
middleman will often step in to help either locate a buyer or transport the
materials to the buyer. 29
Potential buyers include many Middle Eastern states anxious to gain arsenals
of nuclear weapons, but who were prevented from doing so in the past.2 °
According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT Treaty"),23' there are only five
222. Id.
223. See id. (stating that workers at many other nuclear facilities remain unpaid and unhappy).
224. See Zachary Selden, Nunn-Lugar: New Solutions for Today's Nuclear Threats, BENS SPECIAL REP.
(Sept. 1997), at http://www.bens.org/pubs_0997.html (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stressing that
the economic desperation and the lack of security create the danger that nuclear materials could fall into enemy
hands).
225. Id.
226. The Nuclear Black Market, supra note 48, at http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf.
227. See id. (explaining that nuclear thieves usually steal first and then look for a buyer).
228. Id.
229. See id. (asserting that middlemen include corrupt government or military officials, known criminals,
and corrupt brokers).
230. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 7, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRI042701.html (declaring
that Iran and Iraq are two rogue states that have been actively searching for nuclear weapons). Iran serves as a key
participant in the Russian nuclear market, including deals that are endorsed by the government and black market
deals that are not approved by the government. Id.
231. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483 [hereinafter
NPT Treaty] (expressing the view that this treaty would act as a safeguard to all people from the devastation that
could be created by a potential nuclear war). The NPT Treaty stated its purpose as follows:
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation
of all their existing stockpile, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and
the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
Id.
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countries that are authorized to manufacture nuclear weapons.232 These countries
include the United States, France, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom."' All
other countries that are signatories to the NPT Treaty234 cannot manufacture or
otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons. 235 Therefore, the incentive to acquire
236
weapons of mass destruction on the black market is greater.
Although the CSIS Task Force proposes that petty criminals typically make
up the category of nuclear thieves, the threat of ROC taking over this highly
237lucrative role is a real and imminent danger. Weapons of mass destruction were
able to find their way to the United States under the watchful eyes of the militia
during the Cold War, which was the height of Communist control.23 ' Thus, it is
apparent that ROC groups will have no difficulty finding willing participants to
help them obtain weapons of mass destruction in exchange for a hefty sum of
239
money due to the lack of supervision over Russia's nuclear facilities.
C. The Association Between Russian Organized Crime Groups and Terrorist
Groups
The danger of ROC groups becoming involved in the trafficking of nuclear
materials becomes evident when one considers examples of past cooperation
between ROC groups and terrorist groups.24 When Al-Qaeda came to power in the
late 1980s, Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Islamic terrorist group, used
Russian and Chechen 4' organized crime groups to transport heroin from Afghanistan
and launder money for the Taliban.242 Another terrorist group, the Japanese
232. DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: HISTORY, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/nptbi.html#home.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
233. See id. (stating that the five nuclear weapon states agreed to desist relinquishing control of nuclear
weapons and transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to non-nuclear weapons states); see also
NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUND., Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: The Need for a New Agenda, at
http://www.sondra.net/concems/nacdoc.htm (last updated July 3, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(asserting that India, Pakistan, and Israel are nuclear-weapons capable states, but are not nuclear-weapons states).
234. See DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, supra note 232, at http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/nptbi.
html#home.htm (noting that the number of parties to the NPT Treaty has gradually grown to 187 state members
since its enactment in 1970).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See The Nuclear Black Market, supra note 48, at http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf (explaining
that "the potential access to weapons of mass destruction [whether nuclear, biological, or chemical], however, is a
major factor in distinguishing ROC from other criminal threats throughout the world").
238. See id. (stating that during the Soviet era, materials ranging from a small vial of biological weapons to
aircrafts and tanks were accessed by western intelligence agents). This was only possible because of corrupt
Russian military personnel who would either act as a facilitator or look the other way. Id.
239. Id.
240. Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548- I.cfm.
241. Brief Chechen History, Boundaries, at http://www.amina.com/histIbrhist.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). Chechnya was declared a sovereign state on November 11,
1990. Id.
242. See Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-1.cfm (describing that
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Doomsday Sect, perpetrated the 1995 attacks on the Tokyo subways by releasing
sarin nerve gas' 3 Cult members testified that Russia's former First Deputy Prime
Minister Oleg Lobov, in exchange for $100,000, gave the Japanese Doomsday Sect
the product design for sarin nerve gas.z In addition, this Japanese terrorist group
allegedly attempted to buy a nuclear warhead from ROC groups. 24' Since 2000,
there have been reports that Osama bin Laden has bought many suitcase bombs
24
on the Russian nuclear black market.247 Although Russian officials deny the
existence of suitcase bombs, a former member of the Russian National Security
Council admits that Moscow secretly created nuclear suitcase bombs in the 1970s,
and now many of them are missing.24'
Analysts believe Al-Qaeda is actively seeking to purchase nuclear weapons
from Russian contacts]"9 Moreover, German intelligence reports show that ROC
groups are assisting terrorist groups to acquire nuclear and biological weapons in
the Czech Republic.20 This is illustrated by recent investigations into an alleged
attempt by ROC members to sell radioactive matter to Al-Qaeda. 25' Negotiations
took place in Spain between a key figure of ROC and a representative of Al-
Qaeda. 52 While the United States continues to cooperate with Russia in the hunt
for Osama bin Laden's terrorist group, the joint investigation is stymied by strong
suspicions that certain members of Russia's political and military groups are
involved in ROC, leading to fears that Russia is associated with these terrorist
these organized crime groups received anywhere from $133 million to $1 billion per year for their services to
Osama bin Laden); see also Report: Russian Mafia Aids AI-Qaida, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at 2294,
available at http://web.lexis.com/help/multimedia/termhits.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(asserting that "the contacts between the mafia and bin Laden could be related to drug trafficking and such
cooperation would not be surprising").
243. The Nuclear Black Market, supra note 48, at http://www.csis.org/goc/nukemark.pdf.
244. See Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-I.cfm (stating that
overall, Oleg Lobov received up to $100 million dollars for his services to Aum Shinri Kyo, the leader of the
Japanese Doomsday Sect).
245. Tony Wesolowsky, Afghanistan: Nuclear Terrorism Poses Questionable Threat, at http://www.rferl.
orglnca/features/2001/l0/19102001094433.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer).
246. See International Affairs, Suitcase Atomic Demolition Munitions, at http://www.calguard.ca.gov/ia/
Nukes/Testimony%20of%2ODr.%Alexie%20Yablokov.htm (Oct. 2, 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (explaining that a suitcase bomb is simply a small-sized nuclear weapon about the size of a suitcase).
247. See Satter, supra note 48, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5548-I.cfm (clarifying that
the reason why the suitcase bombs have not yet been detonated is because they are protected by Soviet codes that
first require a signal from Moscow).
248. See Patricia Wilson, Russian 'Sure' of Bombs, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/ussr 102/
(1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that Russian scientists claim they worked on the
suitcase bombs and were certain the bombs existed).
249. Bugajski, supra note 100, at http://www.nacional.hr/htm/310053.en.htm.
250. See id. (revealing that many middlemen who operate between Russia and the Czech Republic in
Germany were arrested).
251. See Wesolowsky, supra note 245, at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/10/19102001094433.asp
(explaining that these deals between the Russian mafia and A1-Qaeda are being investigated by several European
security organizations and have not been confirmed).
252. See id. (specifying that negotiations between an ROC member and AI-Qaeda took place in the year
2001).
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factions.253 The fact that ROC groups have been actively involved with terrorist
organizations in the past suggests that well-funded ROC groups will continue to
engage in this practice. Thus, ROC groups may move into the highly lucrative
market of providing nuclear weapons to terrorist groups by smuggling the weapons
out of Russia. Therefore, evidence of cooperation between ROC groups and terrorist
groups emphasizes the imminent need of the United States to find a solution to
the threat that ROC groups will smuggle weapons of mass destruction out of
Russia.
D. Cases Where Nuclear Material Was Smuggled Out of Russia
Since the early 1990s, thefts of nuclear materials in Russia have increased
significantly due to deteriorating economic and security conditions. Fortunately,
a majority of the materials authorities have confiscated from the smugglers have
been useless radioactive matter lacking the potency to produce a nuclear weapon.255
Most of the material has not been weapons-grade.2 6 Nonetheless, nuclear
smuggling should cause U.S. and Russian authorities to take notice of the
possibility that the smuggling of weapons-grade material may follow.257 Over the
past decade, there have been a handful of nuclear seizures, including weapons-
grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium.2 8 A suitcase bomb with the ability
to injure thousands of people does not require a large amount of nuclear material. 9
For example, an amount of plutonium ranging from the size of a hockey puck to
the size of a soda can is sufficient to construct a bomb.2'0 Because "only the tip of
the iceberg is visible" in illicit markets, it is entirely possible weapons-grade
material is being smuggled out of Russia and law enforcement agencies have not
yet detected the shipments. 2 1 Law enforcement agents must realize the possibility
that what they confiscate represents only a small portion of the nuclear materials
traveling through international smuggling rings. 62
253. Id.
254. Lee, supra note 7, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRIO42701.html.
255. See id. (explaining that "radioactive junk" consists of low-grade uranium, cesium-137, cobalt-60, and
other materials that cannot be used to create nuclear weapons).
256. See Phil Williams & Paul N. Woessner, The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling, at http://www.
sciam.com/0196issue/0196williams.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(emphasizing that some analysts dismiss the smuggling incidents as only a minor nuisance).
257. See id. (stating that "even a small leakage could have vast consequences").
258. Lee, supra note 7, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRI042701.html.
259. See Peter Montague, The Fourth Horseman: Nuclear, RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY. NO. 473,
at http://www.ejnet.org/rachel/rehw473.htm (Dec. 21, 1995) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
(specifying that it only takes one kilogram of plutonium or three kilograms of enriched uranium to make a bomb
that is equal to 1000 tons of dynamite).
260. Id.
261. See Williams & Woessner, supra note 256, at http://www.sciam.com/0196issue/0196williams.html
(clarifying that law enforcement agents are less experienced at stopping nuclear materials shipments than they are
at stopping illegal drug shipments).
262. See Lee, supra note 7, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRI042701 .html (stating that there
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The United States must ensure that adequate protections are in place to
prevent future smuggling of weapons out of Russia. One example illustrating
Russian involvement in nuclear weapons smuggling involves a Miami undercover
sting operation commenced in 1995."' The event involved U.S. customs agents
and two ethnic Russians from Lithuania. 6 The two Russian men had known
connections to ROC."' A Miami customs agent, posing as a member of a Colombian
drug cartel, met with Alexander Darichev to discuss the purchase of Soviet made
missiles. 6" Darichev was allegedly a broker of weapons working for Armimex, a
Bulgarian company licensed to manufacture Russian weapon designs."' Darichev
and his partner, Aleksandr Pogrebevskij, soon upped the ante by asking the
• 268
undercover agents if they were interested in purchasing small nuclear devices. This
new deal was given the nickname "Project 2," but was put on the backburner until
the Soviet missile purchase was completed.269
U.S. customs agents set up a front company called Phoenix International to
facilitate the sting operation.2 Armimex was only licensed to sell the missiles to
government agencies. 27' However, Darichev and Pogrebevskij procured an
authentic certificate from the Lithuanian Minister of Defense stating that the
missiles would be sold to the military forces of the Republic of Lithuania.72
Although the two parties became suspicious of each other during the course of
their dealings, they continued to negotiate the sale and purchase of the nuclear• •• 273
missiles. A $50,000 down payment for the missiles was eventually secured. 274
are many undocumented reports indicating that large amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium were
stolen from Russian nuclear labs in the early 1990s). Furthermore, there were many suitcase-sized nuclear weapons
missing from storage facilities, and it is yet to be determined whether these materials have been smuggled out of
Russia. Id.
263. Miami: A Nuclear Smuggling Scenario, FRONTLINE, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/russia/scenario/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Miami] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
264. Id.
265. Id. (indicating that the men had connections to the Russian Mafia).
266. See Brian Wood & John Peleman, The Arms Fixers: U.S. Sting Operation, at http://www.nisat.or
g/publications/armsfixers/Chapter8.html (Nov. 25, 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating
that the customs agent expressed an interest in the shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, which are designed to
destroy low flying airplanes or helicopters).
267. See id. (conveying that Darichev further presented himself as having contacts with government
agencies in Russia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria).
268. See Miami, supra note 263, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/russia/scenario/ (noting
that the undercover agents said that "they would be very interested" in exploring a nuclear weapons deal).
269. Id.; see also Wood & Peleman, supra note 266, at http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/
Chapter8.html (stating that Darichev and a partner of his, Aleksandr Pogrebevskij of Lithuania, would procure
nuclear warheads if "Project 2" went through).
270. Miami, supra note 263, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/russia/scenario/.
271. Id.
272. See id. (stating that the Lithuanian Mister of Defense actually did sign the certificate and has since
resigned).
273. See id. (explaining that the U.S. customs agents' fears were increased when they intercepted a warning
letter to Darichev stating that the men he was transacting with could be undercover agents).
274. Id.
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From the beginning, the undercover operation was the subject of scrutiny and
skepticism by U.S. governmental agencies."' Although the customs agents
wanted to continue the operation in order to discover who was behind the smuggling
operation in Russia, Washington pressured the customs agents to put an end to
the investigation."' However, in July of 1997, U.S. customs agents arrested
Darichev and Pogrebevskij in a Miami hotel room. 77 Darichev cooperated with the
U.S. Attorney by making monitored calls to Armimex confirming the missiles
were ready to be shipped to the United States.2 78 Both men were convicted on
charges of money laundering, smuggling, and conspiracy, but were only sentenced tofouryear in fedral ... 179
four years in a federal penitentiary. While the nuclear materials never actually
made their way to the United States, this case clearly evidences that people are able
to gain access to Russian nuclear materials and move them across international
borders."8 As the first credible case involving a plan to smuggle nuclear weapons
281into the United States, it serves to demonstrate the necessity of the United States'
continued cooperation with Russia to reduce and secure Russia's nuclear arsenal,
thereby preventing this situation from reoccurring.
211
In addition to the Miami arrests, there have been other reported incidents of
nuclear smuggling from Russia. In 1992, a chemical engineer working at a
nuclear institute near Moscow was arrested for stealing 1.5 kilograms of weapons-
grade uranium.2" Additionally, an attempted smuggling scheme allegedly involving
ROC members occurred in 1993. 24 According to press reports, radioactive
beryllium was stolen from a Russian nuclear laboratory, but was seized by police
in Lithuania before it could be sold. 285 The smugglers were going to sell the
beryllium to an Austrian middleman, who was then going to sell it to a Koreanbuyer.286
275. See id. (affirming that U.S. national security policy does not allow for undercover operations that may
bring nuclear materials into the United States).
276. Id.
277. Wood & Peleman, supra note 266, at http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/Chapter8.html.
278. See id. (confirming that there were 40 shoulder-to-air missiles waiting to be shipped).
279. See Miami, supra note 263, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/russia/scenario/
(clarifying that "Jupiter Z" and the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences were both indicted for conspiring to
locate nuclear weapons). Darichev allegedly made calls to an illicit broker for missiles and nuclear weapons. Id.
This alleged broker worked at a scientific institute named "Jupiter Z," which was part of the Russian Academy
of Natural Sciences. Id.
280. Arms Dealers Say Their Goods Ended Up in Iran, BRIEF ON IRAN NO. 690, available at http://
www.iran-e-azad.org/english/boi/06900702_97.html (July 2, 1997) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
281. Miami, supra note 263, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/russia/scenario/.
282. Phinney, supra note 218, at http://www.more.abcnews.go.comisections/world/russia930/.
283. See The Atomic Marketplace, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 6, 1995, at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/95/
1006/feat5.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the suspect
was apparently motivated by newspaper articles that promised great fortunes to those who smuggled nuclear
weapons).
284. Deutch, supra note 8, at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960320c.htm.
285. See id. (indicating that the stolen beryllium was placed in a bank vault in Lithuania, where it remains
today).
286. See id. (reporting that beryllium, which can be sold for as much as $24 million, is used in missile
guidance systems).
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In 1994, a German Intelligence sting operation uncovered 363 grams of plutonium
found in luggage aboard a flight from Moscow. 28 7 The investigation also turned
up documents indicating an offer to smuggle eleven kilograms of weapons-grade
288plutonium from Russia. Later that year, there were two reports of uranium
thefts from two of Russia's nuclear cities, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-65.189 The
thieves were unable to smuggle any nuclear material out of Russia before authorities
arrested them. 29 More recently, in 2001, seven men were arrested in Russia for
attempting to sell over two pounds of highly enriched uranium for $30,000.291
Although there have been few nuclear smuggling cases involving ROC members,
the threat of such participation is likely to increase in the near future.2 92 Nuclear
smuggling is becoming more attractive since ROC groups can find a ready market in
293
rogue states and terrorist groups. Another basis for the increased threat of
nuclear weapons being smuggled out of Russia is the lack of a reliable system to
track Russia's nuclear inventories. 94 There is no way to determine whether any of
Russia's nuclear materials have been stolen. 95 Accordingly, it is necessary for the
United States to remain committed to reducing Russia's stockpile of weapons
and providing greater safeguards to the remaining inventories. The United States
should stay aggressive in its efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation stance in
Russia as well as stay committed to working with foreign governments to prevent
• 296
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
IV. EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES
Realizing the imminent threat Russia's stockpile of weapons poses to the
United States, many programs have been enacted to confront this problem, both
287. See The Atomic Marketplace, supra note 283, at http://www.asiaweek.comasiaweek/95/1006/
feat5.html (articulating that Moscow accused the Germans of setting them up and denied that the plutonium came
from Moscow).
288. See Deutch, supra note 8, at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960320c.htm (stating that this
was enough plutonium to build three nuclear weapons).
289. See id. (pointing out that the incident involving Arzamas-16 was only an attempted theft). In
Chelyabinsk-65, the stolen plutonium was actually found outside of the facility. Id.
290. Id.
291. See Russia Says It Foiled Illegal Sale of Weapons-Grade Uranium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A6
(noting that the suspects were arrested in a town southeast of Moscow and were charged with illegal handling of
nuclear materials).
292. See RUSSIA Mafia and Nuc Material, at http:/lists.jammed.conIWAR/1998/03/0006.htm
(Mar. 2, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (adding that state security officers responsible for
guarding the nuclear materials may actually be helping the criminal groups).
293. See id. (stressing that it would be "foolish" to ignore the organized crime element as part of the nuclear
black market).
294. Montague, supra note 259, at http://www.ejnet.org/rachel/rehw473.htm.
295. See id. (asserting that it is impossible to keep track of Russia's nuclear inventory because of the many
crime organizations operating in Russia).
296. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 26-27 (asserting that the United States' and Russia's futures remain
inexorably linked).
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directly and indirectly. Presidential Decision Directive 42 ("PDD-42"), issued by
291former U.S. President William J. Clinton in 1995, sought to prevent ROC
groups from smuggling nuclear weapons out of Russia by taking a tougher stance
on organized crime. 29 Another program, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, is
a more direct approach to neutralize the threat of nuclear weapons smuggling out of
Russia. It has made substantial strides in reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal and
securing the facilities storing these weapons. z99 Likewise, the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, a non-governmental program, is a multifaceted program designed to take a
direct approach to restructure Russia's nuclear cities and assist with the transition
from weapons production to commercial production.oo
A. U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 42
An important initiative put forth by the United States to control the theft of
nuclear weapons in Russia is PDD-42. PDD-42 was created in response to the
growing threat of organized crime groups throughout the world. 3°, PDD-42
ordered the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to increase resources devoted
to fighting international crime. The Directive aimed to achieve greater
efficiency by improving internal coordination of governmental agencies and
working closely with foreign governments to produce a large-scale solution to
the problem of growing organized crime groups. 3°3 President Clinton, under
PDD-42, released the first International Crime Control Strategy ("ICCS") in May
of 1998. By implementing the ICCS, government officials sought to define
"comprehensive, objective statements of practices governments should employ to
control and combat corruption and organized crime."' 5
297. See THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY (June 1998), at http://www.
fas.org/irp/offdocs/iccs/iccsi.html [hereinafter ICCS] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating more
specifically that PDD-42 was issued on October 21, 1995).
298. See Boone Statement, supra note 206 (asserting that U.S. law enforcement agencies are working
closely with officials in other countries to create strategic approaches to the prevention of organized crime through
the training of law enforcement agents that can investigate and prosecute organized crime members).
299. See Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_0997.html (noting that pursuant to the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act, specialized equipment has been sent to Russia's missile destruction facilities to
assist with dismantlement, including plasma torches and hydraulic sheers to cut through missile exteriors). The
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act has also helped to secure the storage of hundreds of tons of weapons-grade
plutonium and uranium. Id.
300. See Matthew Bunn et al., Retooling Russia's Nuclear Cities, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-
site/pub/reports/city.09.98.html (Sep:./Oct. 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the
NCI should be centered around the following four goals: nonproliferation and arms reduction, nuclear cleanup
technology, private sector development, and downsizing).
301. ICCS, supra note 297, at IB, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/iccs/iccsi.html.
302. Id.
303. See id. The ultimate aim of the ICCS is "(1) increase the priority and resources devoted to this effort;
(2) achieve greater effectiveness and synergy by improving internal coordination; (3) work more closely with other
governments to develop a global response to this threat; and (4) use aggressively and creatively all legal means
available to combat international crime." Id.
304. See Boone Statement, supra note 206 (stating that under PDD-42, the United States has widened the
scope of their comprehensive assistance to other countries in combating organized crime).
305. Id.
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The ICCS sets out eight wide-ranging goals 6 and thirty related objectives to
be used as a blueprint for tackling the international crime problem. 3°7 The purpose
of the ICCS is to create multiple plans of attack that will allow the United States
to work in conjunction with foreign governments to achieve the goal of combating
illegal weapons trade by international crime groups.3  First, this strategy recognizes
that there are certain vulnerabilities common to ail organized crime groups who are
operating on a global basis. ° For example, international criminals crossing borders
expose themselves to searches and identity checks.31° Similarly, money laundering
involving transfer amounts over a specified limit activates financial reporting
requirements, and communication to other members of the crime group subjects
the criminals to potential wiretapping and monitoring. " By striking at these
crime groups where they are weak, the United States can use these vulnerabilities
to its advantage."' Second, the ICCS seeks to secure foreign governments with
insufficient means to combat international crime by strengthening the rule of law
and by cultivating democracy and the free market system.3"3 The United States
306. ICCS, supra note 297, at IC, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/iccs/iccsi.html. The eight goals are:
I. To extend the first line of defense beyond the United States border;
2. To protect United States borders by attacking smuggling and smuggling-related crimes;
3. To deny safe haven to international criminals;
4. To counter international financial crime;
5. To prevent criminal exploitation of international trade;
6. To respond to emerging international crime threats;
7. To foster international cooperation and the rule of law; and,
8. To optimize the full range of United States efforts.
Id.
307. Id. at Table 1- 1. The objectives relevant to the discussion in this Comment are as follows:
1. Prevent acts of international crime planned abroad, including terrorist acts, before they
occur;
2. Use all available laws to prosecute select criminal acts committed abroad;
3. Intensify activities of law enforcement, diplomatic and consular personnel abroad;
4. Establish international standards, goals and objectives to combat international crime by
using bilateral, multilateral, regional and global mechanisms, and by actively encouraging
compliance;
5. Improve bilateral cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement authorities
through increased collaboration, training and technical assistance; and,
6. Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic government and free markets in
order to reduce societies' vulnerability to criminal exploitation.
Id.
308. See Boone Statement, supra note 206 (describing how the ICCS has broadened the United States'
efforts to provide support to other nations in the fight against corruption and organized crime).
309. See ICCS, supra note 297, at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/iccs/iccsi.html (stressing that the ICCS
takes advantage of the organized crime group's vulnerabilities).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See id. (noting that it is important to improve the internal coordination of crime fighting efforts with
foreign nations).
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instituted many programs in accordance with the ICCS to further advance these
goals and reduce the improper use of weapons of mass destruction.
1. The United States' Cooperation with Hungary
The first program to impede the ability to smuggle weapons of mass
destruction out of Russia was implemented in Hungary. Budapest, Hungary is
home to many ROC leaders, making it a prime location to set up investigative
teams. Recent U.S. involvement in Hungary includes the establishment of a
new Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Office and the International Law
Enforcement Academy ("ILEA"). However, cooperation among law enforcement
agencies in the United States and Hungary is not a recent development. As far back
as 1994, the FBI has been working side-by-side with Hungarian leaders to find
effective methods of tackling the ever-growing problem of organized crime."'
a. International Law Enforcement Academy
In an attempt to tackle the problem of emerging crime, former FBI Director
Freeh headed an overseas delegation of law enforcement agencies in 1999 to
determine the feasibility of establishing joint crime fighting programs.316 Freeh
determined that the United States has a significant interest in providing training
to the Hungarian police force in order to eliminate organized crime groups before
they begin to relocate and build new networks around the world.317 Maintaining
an effective liaison between Hungary and the United States ensures successful
international investigations."' For this reason, the United States opened the
International Law Enforcement Academy ("ILEA") in Budapest in 1995.'
The ILEA offers two programs: "(1) an eight-week program for mid-level
police managers, and (2) regional seminars on the topics of International Organized
Crime, Financial Crimes, Narcotics Trafficking ... and the like."'320 In 1997, the
314. See Raymond Bonner, FBI Goes Global: New Hungary Office to Hunt for 'Russian Mafia,'
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Feb. 22, 2000, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/022200-2.htm
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (proclaiming that the FBI has established an office in Budapest
where U.S. investigators will serve full-time).
315. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, FBI and Hungary Join Forces in Fighting Crime
(Oct. 6, 1998), at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/10/981006-hungsupp.htm (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (discussing former FBI Director Freeh's overseas mission to Central and Eastern Europe in 1994).
316. Id. (indicating that the delegation began in 1994).
317. Int'l Law Enforcement Acad., The Law Enforcement Training Mission in Central Europe, at
http://www.usis.hu/ilea.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
318, See Judson M. Ray, Statement on United States-South Africa Relations: Present and Future Before the
Committee on International Relations (Oct. 14, 1999) (discussing the difficulties of having to rely on the ability of
foreign law enforcement agencies and the differences in judicial systems when conducting international
investigations).
319. See id. (establishing that Attorney General Janet Reno and former FBI Director Freeh dedicated ILEA
Budapest in 1996).
320. Id.; see also U.S. Embassy, FBI Director Freeh at the International Law Enforcement Academy May
10, 2000, at http://www.usis.hu/fbi.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
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ILEA conducted seminars for over four thousand police officers from fifty-nine
different countries on topics ranging from bank fraud and embezzlement to crime
scene investigations and bomb detection.32" ' The ILEA program in Budapest trains
police officers322 from Russia, the Baltic States, and Eastern Europe on the use of
effective techniques for combating organized crime.32 3 Instructors concentrate on
teaching leadership skills, personnel and financial management, the investigative
process, and human rights law, rather than focusing solely on technical skills.324
The instructors for the ILEA, all experienced investigators, train police officers
from Eastern Europe and Russia in the conduct of operational policing under the
rule of law.3" The purpose for creating the ILEA was to improve the investigative
standards of police departments, share information with them, and build a relationship
of mutual trust.326 The ILEA has successfully attained all of its objectives. 311 Over
fifty thousand police officers have been trained, and the mutual trust developed
between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe and Russia has
aided in the arrest of many criminals involved in international organized crime.328
b. FBI Office in Budapest, Hungary
With the goal of finding an even more effective method to fight organized
crime, the FBI set up an office in Budapest.329 Although FBI agents have worked
on assignments in foreign countries for many years, primarily as legal attaches in
(adding that the general goal of the ILEA is to provide additional training at the mid-manager's level for law
enforcement officials in Hungary, ex-socialist countries, and the Soviet successor states).
321. See Interview by Chairman Gilman with Louis Freeh, Former Director of the FBI, in
MARKETPLACE MORNING REPORT (Sept. 26, 2001), http://www.math.uic.edu/takata/WorldTradeCenter/WTC_
Articles/financialehicles.htm (copy of file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that the FBI works
hard to train officers according to the particular need in their jurisdiction).
322. See Int'l Law Enforcement Acad., supra note 317, at http://www.usis.hu/ilea.htm (stating that in
order to attend the ILEA the individual must be nominated by his or her country, be at least 25 years of age,
serve as a full-time law enforcement officer with a minimum of five years experience, be in excellent physical
condition and certified for strenuous physical activity by a doctor, be of good moral character, and have at least
a high school equivalency).
323. Leslie Kaciban & Judson M. Ray, International Law Enforcement Academies-The Concept of
ILEA-Budapest, Hungary, J. OF PUB. INQUIRY 29 (2001), available at http://www.ignet.gov/randp/f0lc08.pdf
(copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
324. See id. (accentuating that the ILEA program is a professional development program that can facilitate
fifty students in each of five sessions per year); see also INT'L LAW ENFORCEMENT ACAD., supra note 316, at
http://www.usis.hu/ilea.htm.
325. Former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Statement on International Training Before the Senate
Appropriations Committee (Mar. 20, 1997).
326. See Ron Kampeas, The FBI Expands Its Global Reach, Earning Successes and Friends-But Raising
Questions About Methods, at http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/08060l/LOCfbiap.shtm (Aug. 6, 2001) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that the FBI has made many successful international arrests
because of the mutual trust and cooperation with foreign police officers).
327. See U.S. Embassy, supra note 320, at http://www.usis.hu/fbi.htm.
328. Kampeas, supra note 326, at http://www.savannahnow.conm/stories/080601/LOCfbiap.shtml.
329. Daniel Langenkamp, Budapest and Beyond: FBI Goes Global, CHRtSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 12,
2000, at Al, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/05/12/pls3.htm (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
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U.S. embassies, this is the first time a permanent office has been set up
overseas.33 The agents serve as full time investigators and perform the same tasks
that they do in the United States, but they also work closely with the Hungarian
police force.33 The FBI chose this location because the Hungarian government
requested help in fighting criminal organizations that operate out of Budapest.332
U.S. officials hope to use the FBI office in Budapest as a starting point to open
new offices in other countries that are overcome with international criminal
activity.333 Former FBI Director Freeh met with Eastern European interior ministers
to deliberate on the ever-growing threat of organized crime.3  Eastern European
police forces have been unsuccessful against these crime groups, primarily because
of poor legislation and corruption among government officials. 35 While the police
force in Hungary is the subject of much ridicule, they defend themselves by pointing
to an inadequate and ambiguous penal code (Bunteto Torvenykonyv) and Hungary's
prohibition against undercover agents until 1998.336 The bottom line is that, acting
alone, the Hungarian police force is ill equipped to fight the war against ROC.337 It is
too early to determine what long-term effects the FBI office in Hungary will have on
the fight against organized crime. However, since Hungarian law enforcement agents
are working together with FBI agents to learn more effective methods of combating
organized crime, these cooperative law enforcement efforts are expected to create
significant results.338
330. Id. The FBI has Legal Attache (Legat) offices in 44 countries, which help to coordinate crime-fighting
efforts with international police partners. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Legats, at www.fbi.gov (last visited Oct.
22, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). Legats facilitate resolutions of FBI investigations that
began domestically, but have spilled over into international territory. Id. The main goal of Legats is to deter crime
that affects the United States. Id.
331. Langenkamp, supra note 329, available at http://www.csmonitor.comdurable/2000/05/121pls3.htm.
The FBI is organized into many different divisions including the Administrative Services Division, the Criminal
Investigative Division, and the Criminal Justice Division. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Headquarters and
Programs, at http://www.fbi.gov (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer). The
Criminal Investigative Division coordinates investigations into organized crime, violent crimes, crimes against U.S.
citizen's overseas, and civil rights violations, among others. Id.
332. See Bonner, supra note 314, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/022200-02.htm
(explaining that ROC groups chose to locate in Budapest because it is a good doorway to both the United States
and Western Europe).
333. See Stefan Bos, Hungary/FBI, at http://www.fas.orglirp/news/2000/04/000405-fbil.htm (Apr. 5,
2000) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (conveying the United States' desire to make the Budapest
office an example for other former East-Bloc countries that have experienced a significant rise in crime since the
fall of the Soviet Union).
334. Langenkamp, supra note 329, available at http://www.csmonitor.comdurable/2000/05/12/ pls3.htm.
335. See id. (asserting that "the FBI's expanding role comes as many Eastern Europe police forces,
hampered by porous borders, patchy legislation, and in many cases, bribable public officials and officers, have
proven ineffective against well-financed gangs").
336. Id.
337. See id. (emphasizing that there is not a police force anywhere in the world that is equipped to fight
ROC alone).
338. Press Release, supra note 315, at http://www.fas.orglirp/news/1998/101981006-hungsupp.htm
(exploring the prospects of a stronger law enforcement agency in Hungary now that a committed international
partnership has been created that will allow both the United States and Hungary to move forward against
combating organized crime).
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2. Progress in Combating Organized Crime
While cooperative measures with Hungarian and other law enforcement agencies
have produced positive outcomes, there are still problems that need to be resolved.
The U.S. control of law enforcement aimed at combating organized crime in
Budapest has caused concerns in both the United States and Hungary. Many people
at the U.S. State Department believe that an international incident may result from
the conflict between FBI agents abroad and organized crime members.339 Likewise,
Hungarian officials are cautious when it comes to sharing highly sensitive
information with the United States. 34 The concern is that confidential information
about ROC will be made public through the U.S. court system.M' As the FBI is in
charge of training all personnel involved in ILEA and are operating in the same
manner as they do while in the United States, Hungary's concerns for public
dissemination of information seem warranted. However, left to their own devices,
Hungary's police force does not have the resources or knowledge to effectively
combat "ROC". 342
Moreover, the presence of the FBI in Hungary is producing positive outcomes.
The ILEA has successfully trained thousands of police officers in foreign states on
how to recognize the presence of organized crime and effective ways to approach
these illegal activities.34 The citizens of Hungary are eager to have the FBI within
their borders in the hopes of making their streets safer.3 4
The FBI office and ILEA in Hungary are concentrated on eradicating ROC
and preventing the acquisition of weapons to be used against the United States.45
Even if these law enforcement agencies are able to eliminate ROC, Russia will
continue to house an enormous stockpile of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. Therefore, the United States must continue to work with Russia to
prevent the smuggling of these weapons out of Russia.346 Two programs, the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, are working
to reduce the vast supply of weapons in Russia, and consequently, to prevent
their removal from Russia.
339. Bonner, supra note 314, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/022200-02.htm.
340. See id. (noting that because of Hungary's hesitance to exchange sensitive information with the United
States, the two nations came to an agreement on that subject only weeks before the Budapest FBI Office opened).
341. Id.
342. See Langenkamp, supra note 329, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/05/12/
pls3.htm (recognizing that in the past decade, the Hungarian police have not arrested one high-ranking crime boss).
In defense of the Hungarian police force, they are paid very low salaries and are governed by an inadequate and
ineffective criminal code. Id.
343. Kaciban & Ray, supra note 323, available at http://www.ignet.gov/randp/f0lc08.pdf.
344. See Bos, supra note 333, at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/04/000405-fbil.htm (explaining that
since 1991, Hungary has been immersed in bombings and grenade explosions perpetrated by criminal gang fights).
345. See Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_.0997.html (stating that the primary nuclear
threat comes from terrorists or rogue states that possess nuclear weapons, and the most likely source is Russia).
346. See Threat to Russian Arms Control, at http://www.geocities.com/dmpraha/paper.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (maintaining that Russia is now being targeted by
terrorist groups and rogue states who want to obtain weapons of mass destruction).
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B. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act
U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar sponsored the first of these efforts,
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act ("CTR"), in 1991. 4' Congress enacted this
program in 1993 to serve the security interests of the United States by minimizing the
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. 48 After all, "should nuclear weapons or
sufficient fissile material to produce them become available to rogue states or
terrorist organizations, the U.S. is the most likely target." 49 The purpose of the CTR
Act is to do what is necessary to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction and
the expertise concerning the weapons from being distributed to rogue states or
terrorist groups.3  The CTR Act is very cost-effective because it does not focus on
deterring the use of nuclear weapons, but instead focuses on eliminating the weapons
altogether.35" '
In October of 1993, the CTR Act listed four areas of grave concern as
follows: warhead removal from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus (the former
Soviet states) to Russia; the destruction and dismantlement of all weapons
systems; assistance with the destruction of chemical weapons; and chain of
custody of nuclear materials. 352 The first concern of eliminating all nuclear materials
from the former Soviet states has been effectively dealt with.353 All nuclear
materials previously housed in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus have been
removed and transported to Russia for storage and deactivation.354 However, this
led to a whole new problem. Storage facilities and nuclear institutions in Russia
are poorly guarded and have inadequate control and accounting systems.355 To
combat this problem, the U.S. Department of Energy ("DOE") has installed
monitors and alarm systems at these facilities and implemented more accurate
347. See CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., THE NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCION
PROGRAM, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn-lug/ff nunlu.htm (last modified Mar. 22, 1999)
[hereinafter NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (asserting that the original
legislation, entitled "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reductions Act of 1991," originated from former Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev's request for help in eliminating Soviet nuclear weapons).
348. See id. (adding that former U.S. President George H.W. Bush sought to assist Russia with the
dismantlement and destruction of their nuclear weapons). The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation was broken
up into three sections: "1) substandard materials protection, control, and accounting measures for nuclear weapons
and materials; 2) the possibility of smuggling nuclear weapons and/or components; and 3) potential transfer of
actual weapons, components, and weapons-related knowledge." Id.
349. Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs-0997.html.
350. Id.
351. See id. (stating that one way of reducing the cost is to focus on the core competencies of the program,
which include the destruction and deactivation of Russia's nuclear arsenal).
352. See NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM, supra note 347, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn
Jug/fLnunlu.htm (explaining that there are five objectives of the CTR). However, only the first four have been
thoroughly explored in this Comment.
353. See Bureau of Arms Control, supra note 110, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/200l/index.cfm?
docid=6669 (reiterating that reductions under the START Treaty "have produced stabilizing changes that have
contributed to international security and strategic stability").
354. Id.
355. See Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_0997.html (emphasizing that potatoes are
better guarded than nuclear materials in Russia).
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356
systems to account for the inventories of the nuclear materials. In addition, the
DOE has trained Russian employees in the use and maintenance of these
systems.
357
The core function of the CTR Act is to help Russia dismantle and destroy its
nuclear arsenal. 358 The CTR Act has provided Russia with the necessary equipment
and the initial training of employees to operate the equipment.5 Before the
material can be dismantled, it must be transported to storage facilities by way of
train.36° The CTR Act has improved the safety of the transportation process by
providing armored blankets to cover rail cars and secure the weapons, and by
implementing security systems in the rail cars.16' Russia was able to meet the
disarmament and elimination requirements of the START I Treaty with the help
of the CTR Act. 36' This Act has assisted in the safe destruction of over 3800
warheads, fifty-three bombers, and 597 intercontinental ballistic silos.
363
Overall, the CTR Act has been very successful.3 ' 4 Not only has the program
made significant strides in reaching its core function of reducing nuclear
materials, but it has found ways to utilize unemployed scientists at western
companies and institutes.36' The CTR Act also allows productive members of the
Russian society such as nuclear scientists and biologists to remain in Russia and
perform commercial research.3 6 Nevertheless, the program is not without its
critics. Because the program was funded solely by the Department of Defense,
U.S. citizens believed that the United States was pouring money into Russia's
defense system, and consequently, taking money away from the U.S. defense
356. See id. (explaining that while the Department of Defense initially administered the entire Nunn-Lugar
program, certain functions were eventually given to the DOE and the Department of State).
357. Id.
358. See id. (stating that the strategic arms elimination program reduces the threat of nuclear weapons
falling into enemy hands by combining warheads in secure facilities and providing for safe transportation of all
materials).
359. See CENER FOR NONPROFERATION STUD., CTR PROGRAM DESTRUCION & DISMANfLEMENT, at http://
www.nti.org/db/nisprofsrussia/forasst/ctr/destruct.htm#Chemical%2Oweapons%2Odestruction.htm (last modified Mar. 22,
1999) [hereinafter CR PROGRAM] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (listing the included equipment as
incinerators "to destroy liquid rocket fuel," cranes to help dismantle missile silos, plasma cutters to cut up missiles, and
hydraulic shears to destroy the hulls of nuclear submarines).
360. See Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_.0997.html (articulating that transporting the
nuclear weapons by rail often left them vulnerable to theft, damage, or sabotage).
361. Id.
362. See CTR PROGRAM, supra note 359, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/ctr/destruct.
htm#Chemical%20weapons%20destruction.htm (professing that former U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Perry gave assurances that the Nunn-Lugar program would continue to assist Russia in their quest to meet
START 11 obligations).
363. Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_0997.html.
364. See id. (expressing the belief that the Nunn-Lugar program is producing measurable national security
gains).
365. Id.
366. See id. (stressing that the program does not seek to recruit Russian scientists to companies in the
United States because that would take productive workers who can contribute to Russia's economy out of the
country).
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system.:' However, the CTR Act is now funded through the shared efforts of the
Department of Defense, the DOE, the State Department, and the private sector,
alleviating the strain initially placed solely on the Department of Defense.'
68
Another concern is that the money from the program will not reach the proper
authorities, but will instead be diverted to corrupt officials or ROC groups.69
However, while the program provides equipment and technical assistance to
Russia, it does not deliver cash grants.370 The strict procedures governing the
funding of each project include agreements requiring the audit and examination of
all goods and services provided.37" ' The CTR Act remains one of the most cost-
effective programs for reducing the nuclear stockpile located in Russia.3 72 While the
CTR Act focuses primarily on the elimination of nuclear materials and the safety of
the nuclear facilities,373 the Nuclear Cities Initiative ("NCI") strives to create
civilian employment for the nuclear scientists and engineers working within
Russia's nuclear cities.3 74 This will hopefully be achieved through foreign
investment and the conversion of existing weapons facilities into market-oriented
production companies.375
C. The Nuclear Cities Initiative
The once glorious nuclear cities of Russia offered the best food, facilities,
and wages available.17' To work inside one of Russia's ten nuclear cities meantthat a person was an elite engineer or scientist, enjoying fifty percent higher wages
367. See Threat to Russian Arms Control, supra note 346, at http://www.geocities.com/dmpraha/paper.htm
(emphasizing that the United States was helping to modernize Russia's defense facilities at a time when the budget
had been cut for the United States' own military).
368. Id.
369. See id. (explaining that the Nunn-Lugar program has strict supervision over the funding from the
program).
370. See Selden, supra note 224, at http://www.bens.org/pubs_0997.html (eliminating the argument that
the program is "paying" Russia to abide by its START I Treaty obligations).
371. See Frequently Asked Questions About CTR, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ctr/index.html (last
updated June 15, 1998) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that auditing and examining
ensures that the goods and services are being used for their intended purpose).
372. Lugar Calls Weapons of Mass Destruction No. I Security Threat, June 18, 2001, at http:/www.
uspolicy.bellssues/NMD/luga.061801.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (indicating that the
program costs less than one percent of the U.S. defense budget).
373. See id. (mentioning that, due to the CTR Act, thousands of nuclear missiles that had been pointed at
the United States are now dismantled and are being stored at facilities with improved security systems). The
primary function of the CTR Act is to dismantle Russia's nuclear arsenal. Id.
374. Elena Sokova, Russia: The Nuclear Cities Initiative, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/
forasst/doe/closcity.htm (last updated Apr. 19, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
375. Id.
376. See Michael R. Gordon, The Hidden City: Hard Times Now at Russia's Once-Pampered Nuclear
Centers, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/primary/transform/nci/city. 11.18.98.html (Nov. 18, 1998) (copy on
file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that 30 years ago, the nuclear cities were much cleaner and everything
was in abundance). A resident from one of the nuclear cities explains, "There was no economic panic. We were
young and everything seemed beautiful to us." Id.
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than anyone who worked outside of the closed cities.3 7  But the days of prestige
and wealth are long gone.17' Andrei Sokolov, a nuclear specialist working in
Krasnoyarsk-26, has survived months at a time with no paycheck and has been
forced to go without heat in the harsh Russian winters when the one remaining
nuclear reactor was shut down because of budgetary problems.379 The end of the
Cold War significantly reduced state orders for nuclear weapons, causing a
severe budget cut for nuclear cities.3a° This left many of the 750,000 people living
in these cities with poverty-level wages, and more devastatingly, with a low sense of
self-worth.38'
Discussions between Russia and the United States did not result in the
implementation of any meaningful programs to alleviate such problems in the
nuclear cities. As a result, the non-governmental Russian-American Nuclear
Security Advisory Council ("RANSAC")3 82 organized a conference in Moscow. 383
RANSAC drew up a proposal in 1997, laying out the basic concept of the NCI,
which called for expanded action between Russia and the United States.384 The
primary goal of the NCI is to help the nuclear cities become self-sufficient
through the creation of jobs in the civilian sector, the conversion of nuclear
products into market-oriented products, and the attraction of investors to these
newly converted cities. 5 The second goal seeks to reduce the nuclear cities to a
377. See id. (conveying that the nuclear cities were "[a] bastion of privilege for the Soviet Union's scientific
elite").
378. See id. (conveying that there are no rewards for the many years of hard work in these nuclear cities,
only meager salaries of about $150 per month and small pensions equaling $37).
379. See id. (stating that a budget deficit at Krasnoyarsk-26 delayed a shipment of uranium fuel for the
reactor, which ultimately led to the reactor being shut down for weeks).
380. See Bunn, supra note 300, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/reports/city.09.98.html (explaining
that the diminished budgets have forced leaders of the nuclear facilities to take out high-interest loans with no means to
repay the loans).
381. See Gordon, supra note 376, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/primary/trunsform/nci/city.11.18.98.
html (reporting that people who work inside the nuclear cities feel worthless when they hear others say that everything they
have worked for was unnecessary).
382. See Nuclear Cities Initiative, 1 NUCLEAR CITIES NEWS (Center for Energy and Envtl. Stud., Princeton
U. & RANSAC), Dec. 1999, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/primary/transform/nci/city-news.html (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that RANSAC, created in 1997 to exploit Russian-United
States cooperative nuclear security initiatives, is a nongovernmental agency that is funded solely through private
donors).
383. See Ken Luongo, The Crisis in Russia's Nuclear Cities: Taking the Initiative, in REPAIRING THE
REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 40-41 (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000)
(declaring that government officials tend to be too diversified and caught up in their own priorities to create a
comprehensive program addressing the nuclear city problem). "The Nuclear Cities Initiative is a good example of
how nongovernmental organizations can help facilitate policy." Id.
384. See id. (reporting that the proposal recommended the initiation of activity in three areas: product
commercialization and business training, non-proliferation analysis and collaboration, and environmental
restoration).
385. See Sokova, supra note 374, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm
(explaining that the need for the NCI arose in the mid-1990s when workers began to strike because of unpaid
back wages, attempted nuclear smuggling, and the "brain drain" of the nuclear scientists).
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size that is capable of sustaining its residents.3" This means that an estimated
30,000 to 50,000 jobs need to be created or found.387 In March of 1998, then-Vice
President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin approved the
NCI.3 88 It was formalized on September 22, 1998, when representatives from the
DOE and the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy ("MINATOM") signed the
NCI agreement. 9 Although there are ten nuclear cities in Russia, the NCI began
by focusing on three pilot cities, Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk.
9°
Initially, the NCI had trouble obtaining funding due to the lack of well-
developed conversion plans and the restricted access into the nuclear cities.3 9' The
cities, originally named after the post office box numbers in the nearby open
cities,392 are surrounded by double barbed-wire fences and armed guards.3 93 This
tight access restriction3'94 along with the remote locations of the cities and instability
in Russia's economy are major obstacles to attracting investors. 95 Moreover, the
engineers and scientists employed in the cities have no experience in the private
market or in running a business.3""
Despite these impediments, the NCI has managed to successfully implement
many projects, primarily in the original three pilot cities. In Sarov, an open
computing center397 was opened in 1999 and is estimated to provide roughly 650
386. See Luongo, supra note 383, at 40 (conveying that the nuclear cities need to be reduced because the
Cold War uses of the facilities, such as nuclear weapon design, weapon assembly and disassembly, and the
production of fissile material, are no longer needed).
387. See id. (estimating that the creation of an extra 30,000 to 50,000 jobs is required to reduce the cities to
a size that is consistent with post-Cold War necessities).
388. See id. at 41 (asserting that the NCI proposal was released at the Ninth Session of the Gore-
Chemomyrdin Commission in 1997).
389. See Sokova, supra note 374, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm (noting
more specifically that U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy
Adamov signed the NCI).
390. See id. (stating that by April of 2001, approximately $1.5 million in loans from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was granted to businesses in the three pilot cities).
391. See id. (explaining that funding for the NCI was further delayed by the financial crisis in Russia during
the summer of 1998). The decision by the U.S. Congress to limit 2000 funding to $7.5 million, after an initial
request for $30 million, also stalled the progress of the NCI. Id.
392. Nuclear Cities Initiative, supra note 382, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/primary/transform/
nci/city-news.html (reporting that Russia's 10 nuclear cities have all been renamed, no longer being called by the
post office numbers in the adjacent open cities).
393. See Bunn, supra note 300, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/reports/city.09.98.html
(revealing that the isolation that protects the cities from organized crime also insulates the cities from many of the
opportunities that stem from Russia's economic reform).
394. See Matthew Bunn, The Crisis in Russia's Nuclear Cities: Alternative Employment Opportunities, in
REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 42 (Joseph Cirincione
ed., 2000) (adding that the usual practice is to require permission 45 days in advance of a visit by a foreign guest).
395. Sokova, supra note 374, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm.
396. See Bunn, supra note 394, at 42 (stressing that the United States will need to use their "full spectrum
of tools" for promoting commercial development within these closed cities, including business centers, loan
guarantees, political risk insurance, start up capital, and tax incentives).
397. See Richardson, supra note 1, at 27 (clarifying that an open computing center is a commercial software
enterprise).
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high tech jobs over the next five years."' A similar center has since opened in
Snezhinsk.3'9 Furthermore, a Kansas City weapons production facility is working
with a warhead production facility in Sarov, Avangard, to help convert Avangard
into a conventional weapons production site.4 This would help Avangard turn its
nuclear power capabilities into a commercially viable operation.4°' Also in Avangard, a
facility has been developed where dialysis machines will be produced.40 Finally,
pursuant to the DOE, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is establishing
international development centers in Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk that will
create favorable business climates with the aim of drawing new businesses into the
area, aiding the growth of existing businesses, and enticing new investors.403
When the NCI was created in 1998, very few alternative jobs were available
to nuclear city employees.i To avoid lay-offs and employee strikes, the institute
directors try to extend the available funds to reach every employee, 5 often resulting
in wages that are insufficient and intolerable.4t Because of this economic problem,
there is a great risk that the nuclear materials and the knowledge of how to use them
to make weapons of mass destruction will leak out of these cities and into the
hands of organized crime groups or rogue states& The powerful ROC groups
that have penetrated Russia are in a very good position to capitalize on this
vulnerable nuclear stockpile because of their proximity to the weapons and their
massive ties to other parts of the world.4°8 Thus, it is crucial that those involved in
the creation of the NCI continue to work together with government officials to
focus on the insider threats that flow from the economic hardships in the nuclear
cities.4 To bring the economy in these cities back to levels that can adequately
398. See Nuclear Cities Initiative, supra note 382, at http://www.ransac.org/new-website/primary/
transform/ci/city-mmnews.tml (stating that these computing centers were developed as a result of community
development programs that were created through the cooperation of the DOE and the Russian Minister of
Atomic Energy).
399. Id.
400. See id. (maintaining that the Kansas City Plant has a great deal of experience in transitioning National
Laboratory Research and Development facilities into part of a manufacturing team).
401. Id.
402. See Sokova, supra note 374, at http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/closcity.htm (noting
that the plant on Avangard will be turned into a production line plant).
403. See Nuclear City Initiative, supra note 382, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/primary/transfornV
ci/city-news.html (remarking that in November of 1999, the first International Development Center opened in
Zheleznogorsk).
404. Bunn, supra note 300, at http://www.ransac.org/new-web-site/pub/reports/city.09.98.htm.
405. See id. (declaring that in 1997, one of the nuclear cities, Chelyabinsk-70, had received funds equaling
only half of their expected budget).
406. Id.
407. See Luongo, supra note 383, at 40 (noting that this is an example of how economics are affecting
nuclear proliferation).
408. See Douglas Farah, FBI Chief: Russian Aiafias Pose Growing Threat to U.S., WASH. POST FOREIGN
SERVICE, Oct. 2, 1997, at A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatllongterm/russiagov/
stories/afia100297.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (stating that ROC is a threat to the national
security interests of the United States because they hold the unique opportunity to obtain and traffic nuclear
weapons).
409. See Bunn, supra note 394, at 44 (stressing that the NCI is also helping to build future cooperation
between the United States and Russia conceming nuclear non-proliferation).
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support its residents, long-term jobs must be created and business training must
be provided .4 These cities are a large part of Russia's wealth, and the NCI recognizes
that these cities have the ability to play a vital role in the development of safe nuclear
technology and the protection of nuclear weapons housed in the cities.4" Although
there is still work to be done, the NCI will eventually assist many nuclear scientists and
• 412
engineers in making the switch to commercial employment. If the NCI is
successful, Andrei Sokolov will never have to tell his family that he does not
have enough money to put food on the table, nor will he ever have to contemplate
whether to sell his knowledge about nuclear weapons to a crime group in order to
feed his family.
However, the NCI is not without flaws. Opponents of the NCI suggest that
the NCI is failing to accomplish its purpose; the United States is helping the
Russians develop superior weapons of mass destruction instead of spending
American tax dollars to employ Russian nuclear scientists. 4 3 A report by the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") advised that the NCI will not serve as a
stimulus for long-term economic growth in Russia's nuclear cities, but insteadS 414
will likely serve as a mere subsidy program, and should therefore be cut back.
One DOE official has gone so far as to call the NCI a "resounding failure"
because of the lack of adequate oversight and the shortage of direct involvement
by U.S. industries.4 1 1 U.S. Congresswoman Tauscher, who spent a week in Russia
inspecting the effects of the NCI, criticized the GAO report.41 6 She stated that the
report should be used to improve the NCI, which is crucial to U.S. security
interests, instead of obstructing its progress. 417 Although there is always the
chance that taxpayer dollars will be misappropriated, the United States must
410. See Rose Gottemoeller, The Crisis in Russia's Nuclear Cities: The Nuclear Cities Initiative: A Good
Start Down a Long Road, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 45-46 (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000) (exposing that software development and engineering
consulting are two fields that are being strongly considered because they require the kind of knowledge possessed
by employees in the nuclear cities and require very little capital improvement).
411. See Lev Ryabev, The Crisis in Russia's Nuclear Cities: The Nuclear Cities Initiative: A Russian
Perspective, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 50
(Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000) (acknowledging that the nuclear cities have large obstacles to overcome, such as the
radioactive contamination at the facilities and their location far away from industrial centers).
412. See id. (stating that the NCI has a goal to create 15,000 new jobs).
413. See Kenneth R. Timmerman, Russo-American Nuclear Cities, at http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/cities.htm
(July 1999) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (mentioning that this criticism came from a recent
review by the General Accounting Office).
414. See id. (suggesting that the DOE should be more aggressive in checking the backgrounds of Russian
scientists receiving money from the United States so that the money is not used to subsidize the development of
new weapons).
415. See id. (asserting that the DOE further claims that a majority of U.S. taxpayer money invested in
Russia has been misdirected, as this money has done nothing to convert the nuclear facilities to practical civilian
projects).
416. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Tauscher, Just Back from Russia, Inspection of Nuclear
Cities Initiative, Voices Concern over Reaction to GAO Report (Feb. 22, 1999), at http://www.house.
gov/tauscher/2-22-99.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
417. See id. (explaining that although improvements can be made in the program's efficiency, it is
important for this program to be successful).
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continue to support the NCI so that nuclear scientists do not leave Russia and
team up with rogue states such as North Korea or Iraq, who are attempting to
411develop nuclear weapons.
Pursuant to the NC, U.S. nuclear scientists are training their Russian
counterparts in business techniques and management skills. 4'9 This seems
preposterous because scientists are not educated on how to run a business, nor do
they have any notion of commerce. 40  Furthermore, Russian lab directors
themselves declared that it was unrealistic to think that Russian scientists trained
under the Soviet system could make the transition to a market-based economy.421
Nonetheless, because the economic problems in Russia have proven to be much
more persistent than first thought in the early 1990s, former nuclear scientists and
engineers must learn to work in a market-based economy. The NCI's main goal
should not focus on maintaining Russia's nuclear cities, but instead should focus
on creating civilian employment for the people who work inside the nuclear
cities .4
The NCI is deemed a success because it has found temporary employment
for thousands of nuclear scientists throughout Russia.424 But temporary
employment does not help to further the goal of the NCI, which is to help
Russia's nuclear city employees make the transition from producing weapons
of mass destruction to producing commercial products.42 Instead of allotting
money to keep these nuclear facilities open, the United States should promote
long-term investments in new civilian factories built from the ground up.426 In
order to attract and retain foreign investors, Russia must create a more open
environment and allow U.S. businesses greater access to the nuclear cities.427
418. See id. (noting that during her visit to Russia, Congresswoman Tauscher learned that 50,000 scientists
were going to be laid off).
419. See Timmerman, supra note 413, at http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/cities.htm (indicating that the aim of
the NCI is to assist Russia in developing commercial projects that will attract foreign investment).
420. Id.
421. See id. (expressing the opinion that nuclear labs are not the right forum to raise capital and develop
market-based products because of scientists' lack of expertise).
422. See Gottemoeller, supra note 410, at 45 (recognizing that a considerable amount of time will pass
before Russia's economy will have positive growth).
423. See Timmerman, supra note 413, at http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/cities.htm (noting that the idea of
giving nuclear scientists money in exchange for their promise not to leak out nuclear knowledge is a mere fantasy).
424. Id. (emphasizing that former Pentagon Official Henry Sokolski believes that it is absurd to think that
U.S. nuclear scientists can help Russian scientists to commercialize their nuclear technology).
425. See id. (emphasizing that out of 400 projects supervised under the DOE in Russia, none of them have
had long-term success).
426. See id. (stating that "patient capital" goes toward long-term investments, whereas "venture capital"
goes toward short-term investments).
427. See Press Release, supra note 416, at http://www.house.gov/tauscher/2-22-99.htm (underscoring the
fact that Russian involvement with rogue states is another factor that is hindering foreign investment in Russia).
2002 / Weapons of Mass Destruction Stockpiled in Russia
D. Are These Programs Effective?
Overall, the programs undertaken by the United States have produced
remarkable improvements in the reduction and protection of Russia's stockpile of428
weapons. Since 1994, when the United States began actively facilitating
cooperative programs with Russia, thousands of nuclear weapons have been
429dismantled. In addition, tons of nuclear material, including plutonium and
highly-enriched uranium, have been blended into forms that can no longer be
used to produce nuclear weapons, and facilities housing weapons of mass destruction
are now equipped with new security and accounting systems.43°
Although these programs have made great improvements, the rate of progress
does not appear to match the urgency of the threat posed by the current state of
weapons stockpiled in Russia.431 Russia's stockpile of weapons remains severely
oversized and inadequately protected.412 Under a supply-demand analysis, the
focus is often placed on the supply side because stockpiled weapons are stored in
a country unable to establish a rule of law or control the reign of organized crime.433
The demand side focuses on criminal groups, rogue states, and terrorists largely
left to their own devices because of the lack of a central law enforcement agency
able to decipher how these adversaries are organized and financed.4  More
emphasis must be placed on the demand side of the analysis, which will equip
international law enforcement agencies with the tools to decrease the ability of
431
rogue states and terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons.
The effective implementation of many programs has been hampered by the
436lack of access to Russia's nuclear facilities. The United States is insistent on
auditing and inspecting Russian facilities and ensuring the proper use of U.S.
funds.4 ' However, Russian officials are hesitant to provide unlimited access to
428. See Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile
Material, at http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/papers/carnegie.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (expressing the opinion that these cooperative programs are the most cost-
effective investments in the United States' budget protecting security interests).
429. See id. (reporting that the people who helped initiate these programs have made great contributions to
the security of the United States).
430. Id.
431. See id. (explaining that a lack of funding from the United States and a lack of leadership are stifling the
pace of progress).
432. See id. (adding that less than one-sixth of Russia's plutonium and uranium are protected by modern
security systems, and less than one-tenth of the highly-enriched uranium has been blended into a non-weapons
usable form).
433. See Lee, supra note 7, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/FPRI042701.html (analogizing
Russia's nonproliferation problem to the war against drugs in Columbia). In both Russia and Columbia, leaders
are unable to control their own institutions, thereby impeding the effectiveness of U.S. assistance. Id.
434. Id.
435. See id. (arguing that a nuclear security strategy must move beyond containment of nuclear weapons
and begin to track the procurement efforts of terrorists and rogue states).
436. Kenneth N. Luongo, The Uncertain Future of U.S. -Russian Cooperative Security, at http://www.arms
control.org/act/001-01-02/luongojanfebOl.asp (Jan./Feb. 2001) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
437. See id. (stating that recently the United States has become more adamant about access to the Russian
nuclear facilities).
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these facilities because of the sensitive information they contain. Success will only
be achieved through a compromise between the United States and Russia,
satisfying the United States' concerns for proper implementation and easing
Russia's tensions about the loss of classified information. 9
A further impediment to the United States' efforts to remedy Russia's
weapons smuggling problem is the lack of accounting methods for Russia's
weapons of mass destruction."0 A new database compiled by the Institute for
International Studies ("11S") was created to account for illicitly trafficked radioactive
material." The database is divided into different categories, including the type of
material stolen, the suspected origin, the reported destination, and the intended442
use. The United States should assist Russia in developing a similar database to
ensure an accurate account of its existing supply of weapons as well as the type,
amount, and use of the missing weapons. It is important to have a reliable accounting
system to determine what has been stolen or lost."3
Furthermore, the United States must take a comprehensive review of all the
cooperative nuclear security programs implemented in Russia and assess their
strengths and weaknesses.40 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United
States has implemented many programs to address the proliferation problem in
Russia, costing the United States millions of dollars each year.445 The successful
portions of each program should be integrated into one cohesive strategy, eliminating
overlap and past failures. 446 Additionally, there should be one coordinator appointed
to supervise and administer all cooperative nonproliferation programs.447 While the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the DOE have all played a part in
overseeing different cooperative programs, there has never been one person
appointed to lead the programs.448 When all is said and done, it will be impossible to
438. See id. (adding that the Russians have less access to U.S. facilities than the United States has to
Russian facilities).
439. Id.
440. See CIA Report, supra note 9, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pollterror/02022602.htm (affirming that
undetected smuggling of nuclear weapons has occurred, although the extent of the thefts are unknown).
441. See Lisa Trei, New Database Tracks Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material Worldwide, at
http://www.stanford.edu.dept/news/pr/02/database36.html (Mar. 5, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (noting that the HS database tracks missing radioactive material worldwide).
442. See id. (adding that the database identifies the routes used to traffic the illicit material and how these
routes have changed over the past 10 years).
443. Id.
444. See Luongo, supra note 436, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_01-02/luongojanfeb01.asp
(emphasizing the importance of incorporating the maintenance of relations between the United States and Russia
into the cohesive strategy).
445. See Bunn, supra note 428, at http://infomanage.comnonproliferation/papers/carnegie.htm (reporting
that other nations have contributed to Russia's nonproliferation, although on a much more limited basis).
446. Id.
447. See Luongo, supra note 436, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/200101-02/luongojanfebO 1.asp
(asserting that high-level leadership needs to be stressed to effectively implement cooperative programs with
Russia).
448. See id. (stating that the DOE has been largely responsible for promoting and defending the cooperative
agenda of the U.S. government with Russia, primarily because the DOE's budget for international cooperative
action is substantial).
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achieve permanent and transparent reductions in Russia's stockpile of weapons
without the United States' assistance in implementing improved security and
accounting systems for Russia's nuclear facilities."4 Therefore, the United States
must continue to prioritize and improve upon its cooperative programs with Russia in
order to facilitate the stability of Russia's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction.45
V. CONCLUSION
More than thirty years after the Cold War, the United States and Russia are
no longer adversaries. Instead, they find themselves facing a whole new set of
security issues. These issues are not derived from the animosity between the two
superpowers, but rather from the massive stockpile of weapons of mass destruction
that remains in Russia. Because of this, the United States has been active in
working with Russia and other foreign governments to secure the safety of our
nation through the use of treaties and cooperative programs in order to prevent
the theft of weapons of mass destruction. It is in the United States' best interest to
help minimize and secure Russia's nuclear arsenal in order to prevent an attack
by rogue states or terrorists.
Determining the amount of assistance to give Russia in the next millennium
will continue to be a fervently debated topic, as there will always be people who
feel the United States has no business funding Russian programs. However, it is
in the security interests of the United States to not only remain committed to the
treaties and programs already in place, but to continually build upon relations
with foreign governments and strive towards creating a stable environment in
Russia. Turning a blind eye to the weapons stockpile and storage problems in
Russia will only increase the risk that weapons of mass destruction originating in
Russia will one day be used against the United States. Therefore, the United
States should continue to support these programs and aim towards an even more
vigorous stance in the next millennium.
449. Bunn, supra note 428, at http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/papers/carnegie.htm,
450. See id. (affirming that the United States must consider the management of its cooperative programs as
a top priority for the its security interests).
451. See id. (stating that "in 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President George H.W. Bush
formally declared that their countries did not regard each other as potential enemies").
